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Summary:  The present work focuses on the consideration of some substantive principles that play a primary 
role both in the context of multilateral trade and in the international investment sector. Specifically, the 
principle of proportionality represents a fundamental tool in the national legal systems and in many 
international contexts for balancing competing rights and interests. This qualification, including the assessment 
of the intensity of the investigation conducted by the bodies involved in the resolution of the dispute which 
forms an integral part of it, leads us to question the configurability not only of a role for the principle of 
proportionality within the two systems considered, but in particular also of a correspondence between them, in 
its interpretation and concrete application 
 
Key words:  principle of proportionality, WTO, ICSID, BIT, AB, TBT. 
 
Resumen:    El presente trabajo se centra en la consideración de algunos principios sustantivos que juegan un 
papel principal tanto en el contexto del comercio multilateral como en el sector de inversión internacional. 
Específicamente, el principio de proporcionalidad representa una herramienta fundamental en los sistemas 
legales nacionales y en muchos contextos internacionales para equilibrar derechos e intereses en competencia. 
Esta calificación, incluida la evaluación de la intensidad de la investigación realizada por los organismos 
involucrados en la resolución de la disputa que forma parte integral de la misma, nos lleva a cuestionar la 
configurabilidad no solo de un papel para el principio de proporcionalidad dentro de los dos sistemas 
considerados, pero en particular también de una correspondencia entre ellos, en su interpretación y aplicación 
concreta. 
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 1.Introduction 
 
Our analysis implies a creative approach of the principle of proportionality. The deciding 
body to which the measure is subject is required to examine the existence of alternative 
policies that could have led to a better optimization of interests or rights involved conflicts2. 
This is a phase involving an evaluation of values. The answers to the questions raised 
depend on implicit assumptions and opinions of a political, moral, ideological and economic 
nature held by the judging bodies3. The consequent risk is constituted by the possibility that 
the judging body, with an excessively intrusive approach, replaces its own judgment with 
that of the authority in assessing the importance of avoiding damage to the protected right or 
interest, with respect to the need to reach the goal. 
The principle of proportionality can be considered as a specific procedural obligation. In 
fact, it requires public or judicial authorities to justify decisions on the basis of rational legal 
arguments and in a structured way. What must be taken into consideration and justified is the 
importance attributed to each interest, the degree of interference and the way in which the 
conflicting interests are balanced with each other4.   
In fact, the importance of principles and the proportionality is of primary importance in a 
system in which there is no precise hierarchy of rules and if the resolution of a dispute 
cannot be based simply on clear legislative provisions. 
 
2.Revision standards 
 
The examination of the principle of proportionality brings with it the assessment of the 
investigation intensity conducted by the judging bodies against the measure subject to the 
dispute. The consideration of "review standards”5, although frequently treated as 
autonomous, constitutes an aspect necessarily inherent in the application of the principle 
                                                 
2B. KINGSBURY, S.W. SCHILL, Public law concepts to balance investors’ right with State regulatory actions in the public 
interest-the concept of proportionality, in  S.W. SCHILL (ed.), International investment law and comparative public law, 
Oxford University Press, New York, 2010, pp. 78ss. J. ARATO, The private law critique of international investment law, in 
American Journal of International Law, 111 (1), 2019, pp. 22ss. 
3A.D. MITCHELL, C. HENCKELS, Variations on a theme: Comparing the concept of necessity in international investment 
law and WTO law, in Chicago Journal of International Law, 4, 2013, pp. 93ss. W. BURKE-WHITE, A. VON STADEN, 
The need for public law standards of review in investor-state arbitrations, in S.W. SCHILL, (ed.), International investment 
law and comparative public law, Oxford University Press, New York, 2010, pp. 689-690. B. MERCURIO, K. JUNG NI, 
Science and technology in international economic law. Balancing competing interest, ed. Routledge, London & New York, 
2013, pp. 125ss. Z. DOUGLAS, J. PAUWELYN, J.E.VIŇUALES, The foundations of international investment law: 
Bringing theory into practice, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014. M. AKBARA, G. CAPURRO, Investing challenges 
in investment arbitration, ed. Routledge, London & New York, 2018. 
4M. ANDENAS, S. ZLEPTNIG, Proportionality: WTO law in comparative perspective, in Texas International Law Journal, 
42, 2007, pp. 372ss. H. ZÚŇIGA SCHRODER, Harmonization, equivalence and mutual recognition of standards in WTO 
law, Kluwer Law International, New York, 2011, pp. 102. Y. LEVASHOVA, The right of states to regulate in international 
investment law: The search for balance between public interest and fair public equitable treatment, Kluwer Law 
International, New York, The Hague, 2019. V. VADI, Proportionality reasonabliness and standards or review in 
international investment law and arbitration, Edward Elgar Publishers, Cheltentham, 2018. N. MUHAMMAD, A 
comparative approach to margin of appreciation in international law, in The Chinese Journal of Comparative Law, 7 (1), 
2019, pp. 114ss. 
5S. ZLEPTNIG, The standards of review in WTO law: An analysis of law, legitimacy and the distribution of legal and 
political authority, in European Business Law Review, 13, 2002, pp. 456ss. J. SHI, Free trade and cultural diversity in 
international law, Bloomsbury Publishing, New York, 2013, pp. 293ss.  R. BECROFF, The standard of review in WTO 
dispute settlement: Critique and development, Edward Elgar Publishers, Cheltenham, 2012, pp. 72ss. 
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under examination. The degree of intensity of the analysis not only determines how 
rigorously the judging bodies evaluate the conformity of the measure with the substantive 
requirements6, but also reflects and influences the allocation of powers between the latter 
and the national authorities that adopted the contested decision7.   
The revision standard that must be applied by the single international judicial body can be 
expressly indicated within the treaty governing its powers. If this indication is not present, it 
is believed that the determination of these standards constitutes an implicit power of the 
courts involved in the dispute, necessary for the exercise of the functions attributed to them8.   
In the context of the WTO dispute resolution system and according to the Convention of 
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the determination of 
the "review standards"9 constitutes an aspect of the power of the judging bodies not 
expressly indicated respectively within the Agreement relating to the resolution of disputes, 
let alone in the ICSID Convention, in line with the strictly procedural nature of the 
discipline contained in the latter. The lack of this indication has led, in both systems (WTO, 
ICSID), to the need to identify the applicable standards in the disputes submitted to the 
judging bodies, considering the use of the application of the proportional analysis as a 
possible answer to the question. 
This issue is of particular relevance in the context of disputes between private investors and 
host States of the investment, given the absence of a degree of appeal on the merits of the 
decisions taken by the arbitral tribunals. This resulted in the cruciality of identifying the 
most appropriate audit standards. Issue whose relevance also emerges in the context of the 
resolution of commercial disputes within the WTO, in which, however, the existence of a 
degree of appeal that allows the review on the merits of the decision, whose judgment is 
attributed to a centralized body and permanent, it allows to limit the risk of analysis 
excessively or insufficiently intrusive or to correct its scope. 
 
3.Revision standards in the WTO system 
 
In the WTO dispute resolution system, the concept of revision standard refers to the nature 
and intensity of the examination of the national measure submitted to the judgment 
conducted by the Panels and the Appellate Body (AB). 
Searching within the WTO agreements, of which the understanding for the resolution of 
disputes constitutes a part, the presence of an indication regarding the auditing standards, 
reveals the lack of express discipline of the same. The only exception found is article 17.6 of 
the Agreement10 relating to the implementation of article VI GATT (Anti-Dumping 
Agreement)11. 
                                                 
6M. ANDENAS, S. ZLEPTNIG, Proportionality: WTO law in comparative perspective, op. cit., pp. 672ss. 
7M. ANDENAS, S. ZLEPTNIG, Proportionality: WTO law in comparative perspective, op. cit., pp. 395ss. A.D. 
MITCHELL, C. HENCKELS, Variations on a theme: Comparing the concept of necessity in international investment law 
and WTO law, op. cit. 
8A.D. MITCHELL, C. HENCKELS, Variations on a theme: Comparing the concept of necessity in international investment 
law and WTO law, op. cit. 
9V. VADI, Proportionality reasonabliness and standards or review in international investment law and arbitration, op. cit. 
10D. BETHLEHEM, D. MCRAE, R. NEUFELD, The Oxford handbook of international trade law, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2009, pp. 388ss. R.M. BOLTON, Anti-dumping and distrust. Reducing anti-dumping duties under the WTO 
through heightened scrutiny, in Berkeley Journal of International Law, 29 (1), 2011, pp. 70ss. 
11In particular see the case: EC-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (EC-Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R e 
WT/DS48/AB/R, Report of the Appellate Body, 16 January 1998, para. 114. G. MARCEAU, J.P. TRACHTMAN, A map of 
the World Trade Organization law of domestic regulation of goods: The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, in Journal of World 
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This shortcoming led the Appellate Body to consider itself equipped with the authority to 
determine the auditing standards applicable by virtue of the implicit powers deriving from 
the same in the WTO Agreements12. The need to fill this gap, in fact, was perceived by the 
Appellate Panel, which, in the EC-Hormones case, took the opportunity to define a general 
revision standard. First of all, AB considers the nature of these standards with reference to 
the Agreement on sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS Agreement), believing that they 
must reflect "the balance established in that Agreement between the jurisdictional 
competences conceded by the Members to the WTO and the jurisdictional competences 
retained by the Members for themselves"13. Secondly, it does not consider the lack of an 
explicit provision in this regard as a shortcoming of the system, with the consequent 
inapplicability of any revision standards; on the contrary, in article 11 of the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU)14 we find the generic forecast that allows the resolution of 
the question. As regards the activity of the Panels, the applicable standard can be neither a 
de novo review, nor a total deference, but an objective assessment both with reference to the 
facts and with regard to the legal issues involved in the measure subject to the procedure15.   
Indeed, through the de novo revision, the panel's assessments would be replaced by those of 
the national authorities, with a consequent excessive intrusion into the competence of the 
Member State. Conversely, the total deference is also inappropriate as a violation of both the 
jurisdictional powers attributed to the WTO by the States and, in particular, of the provisions 
of article 11 DSU16.   
The indication of the "objective assessment" contained in article 11 appears to be somewhat 
generic and in need of further substantial clarifications, in order to effectively apply the 
standard identified to the individual concrete cases. In this regard, the Appellate Body 
revision along two lines: On the one hand, the Panel invested with the question is required to 
verify whether the factual aspects have been correctly and sufficiently demonstrated; on the 
other, with reference strictly to elements of law, a certain margin of discretion is believed to 
exist in to the Member States, subject to the condition that their conclusions have been 
adequately illustrated and justified17. 
The Appellate Body makes a further clarification relating to the distinction in the 
identification of the revision standard according to whether the disputed measure is analyzed 
at first instance or is made an appeal. In fact, the same judicial body stops to clarify that the 
subject of review on appeal can only be aspects of law addressed and legal interpretations 
adopted by the Panel, while questions of fact remain precluded from the possibility of 
review18. Once this clarification has been made, the performance by the Panel of the 
objective assessment required by article 11 DSU is considered a matter of law which, if 
raised, can be subject to review on appeal; while, they cannot be qualified as such aspects 
                                                                                                                                                      
Trade, 48 (2), 2014. M.M. DU, Standard of review under the SPS agreement after EC-Hormones II, in The International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, 59 (2), 2010, pp. 444ss. M. KENDE, The trade policy review mechanism. A critical 
analysis, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018. 
12EC-Hormones, AB Report, para. 114-117. 
13EC-Hormones, AB Report, para. 115 
14D. LIAKOPOULOS, Evolutionary, dynamic or contemporary interpretation in WTO system?, in The Chinese Journal of 
Global Governance, 5, 2019, pp. 22ss. 
15EC-Hormones, AB Report, para 117-118 
16D. LIAKOPOULOS, Evolutionary, dynamic or contemporary interpretation in WTO system?, op. cit. 
17M. OESCH, Standards of review in WTO dispute resolution, in Journal of International Economic Law, 6, 2003, pp. 635, 
640-641. K. KULOVESI, The WTO dispute settlement system: Challenges of the environment, legitimacy and 
fragmentation, Kluwer Law International, New York, 2011, pp. 137ss. Y.S. LEE, Safeguard measures in world trade: The 
legal analysis, Edward Elgar Publishers, Cheltenham, 2014. 
18EC-Hormones, AB Report, para. 13. 
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pertaining to the evaluation of the evidence that has been provided in relation to the measure 
submitted to the judgment. 
Although abstractly the distinction may appear clear, in its concrete application the boundary 
becomes rather blurred: The duty to carry out an objective assessment of the facts entails the 
obligation to screen and evaluate the evidence presented. It follows that the lack of 
consideration, as well as the voluntary distortion or misrepresentation, also conflict with the 
need for an objective assessment, in addition to being able to possibly also constitute a 
violation of the principle of fair trial19. Therefore, the aspect indicated constitutes a problem 
of no small importance in the concrete application of the general revision standard identified 
by the AB which again translates, on the one hand, into the need to identify and delimit the 
scope of the revision that can be conducted in the appeal phase; on the other, in the need to 
ensure respect for the balance between the competence attributed to the WTO and that 
which, however, remains with the States. 
Also in the case of the Argentina-Footwear Safeguard case, the Appellate Body confirms 
that for all WTO agreements, with the exception of the Anti-dumping Agreement, article 11 
DSU establishes the appropriate revision standard to which the Panels must comply20. The 
AB, in fact, considers the same reasoning applied with reference to the EC-Hormones case 
applicable, although the agreement involved is different, specifically relating to the 
safeguard measures. In taking up the concept enshrined in the previous ruling and with 
reference to the provisions of article 4 of the Agreement in question, the Appellate Body 
considers part of the "objective assessment" not only the verification of the examination of 
the relevant facts by the state authorities and the consequent necessary presence of a 
reasonable justification of the same, but also the assessment of the applicability and 
compliance with the relevant agreements21. There remains the firm exclusion of the 
opportunity for a de novo review of the measure, as well as the possibility for the Panel to 
replace its own analysis and judgment with those of the state authorities. 
The issue is resumed in the US-Lamb Meat case, with specific reference to the Agreement 
on safeguard measures, where the Appellate Body breaks down the objective assessment on 
the basis of two characters: A formal one relating to the assessment of all the relevant factors 
to by the competent authorities, and the other substantive involving the verification of the 
reasonableness and adequacy of the justification provided by the authorities in relation to the 
respective determination22. 
In re-emphasizing the lack of ownership by the Panels of the power to carry out a de novo 
review, or to replace their findings to those of the state authorities, the AB goes a step further 
by stressing that, as just stated, it does not have the consequence the obligation of the first 
instance body to limit itself to accepting such conclusions. The assessment of the 
reasonableness and adequacy of the justifications can only be carried out correctly with a 
critical approach. There is an obligation for the Panels to review whether the justification 
provided fully addresses the nature and complexity of the data or responds to other plausible 
interpretations of the same. It follows from this the possible presence of explanations of 
                                                 
19EC -Hormones, AB Report, para. 133. 
20Argentina-Safeguard Measures on Import of Footwear (Argentina-Footwear Safeguard), WT/DS121/AB/R, Report of the 
Appellate Body, 14 December 1999, para. 116-122. 
21Argentina -Footwear Safeguard, Appellate Body Report, para. 121-122. 
22US-Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia (US-Lamb 
Meat), WT/DS177/AB/R, WT/DS178/AB/R, Report of the Appellate Body, 1 May 2001, para. 103. For further details see: 
J. TOLE MARTİNEZ, Soluciòn de controversias en los TLC. Aportes del derecho de la OMC, U. Externado de Colombia, 
2014. V.D. DYE, Deference as respect in WTO standard of review, in Journal of International Trade Law and Policy, 18 (3), 
2013. 
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alternative facts that are equally plausible or that make what the national authorities have 
said inadequate. This consideration leads the AB to identify a duty for the opening panels 
towards a possible lack of reasonableness or adequacy of the justification provided by the 
competent authorities. Therefore, through an overall reading of the legislation that is in 
evidence, the exclusion of a de novo revision cannot be interpreted in an impediment to the 
duty of the judging body to ascertain the lack of reasonableness or adequacy in the 
justification of the measure. Nor can this fulfilment be read as a substitution by the Panel of 
its own conclusions to those of the competent national authority23. 
It is with the ruling relating to the US-Cotton Yarn case that the AB summarizes all the 
aspects addressed in the previous decisions in relation to the audit standard. The Panels must 
ascertain whether all the relevant factors have been assessed, if the competent authorities 
have examined the facts and if adequate justification was given of how they support the 
determination, as well as whether this justification corresponds entirely to the nature and 
complexity of the information or if it responds to other plausible interpretations. In any case, 
it further reiterates the impossibility of conducting a de novo review or of replacing the 
Panel's judgment with that of the competent authority24. 
Despite the apparent clarity of the configuration of the revision standards elaborated by the 
WTO jurisprudence, the concrete application of the same, as well as the doctrinal opinions 
related to it, acknowledge the persistence of disputes. The same definition of objective 
assessment provided by the AB, in fact, does not determine the specific nature and intensity 
of the review that the Panels are required to carry out. In addition, the same is suitable for 
lending itself to different variations due to the specific WTO agreement that is relevant with 
reference to the disputed measure. 
In WTO law, the concept of revision standards has been defined as hybrid by reason of the 
interaction between procedural and substantive rules which, as a whole, specify the role of 
the Panels in the review of decisions of national authorities25. In addition, the nature and 
intensity of the same depends, as has been specified, on various factors that influence each 
other or are in a relationship of dependence on each other. The intensity of the review that is 
carried out by the judging body has a significant impact on the assessment of the conformity 
of the measure subject to the procedure with the requirements prescribed by the reference 
agreement26. The application of the principle of proportionality, as the revision method used 
by the Panels and the AB, therefore, is not only governed by the relationship examined 
between aspects of a substantial nature and purely procedural features, but constitutes a 
concrete and representative expression of the way in which the dispute resolution bodies 
have applied the objective assessment examined. 
 
4.The revision standards in the resolution of disputes according to the ICSID 
Convention 
 
The issue of the standard of revision applicable by arbitration courts in the context of 
disputes between private investors and host states is anchored in the not strictly private 
                                                 
23US-Lamb Meat, Appellate Body Report, para 106-107. 
24US-Transitional Safeguard Measures on Combed Cotton Yarn from Pakistan (US-Cotton Yarn), WT/DS192/AB/R, Report 
of the Appellate Body, 8 October 2001, para 74. See also in argument: L. GRUSZCZYNSKI, W. WERNER, Deference in 
international courts and tribunals: Standard of review and margin of appreciation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014. 
25H. SPAMANN, Standard of review for World Trade Organization panels in trade remedy case: A critical analysis, in 
Journal of World Trade,  38, 2004, pp. 503, 514ss. 
26M. ANDENAS, S. ZLEPTNIG, Proportionality: WTO law in comparative perspective, op. cit., pp. 398ss. 
      
                                                                                                            Número 1 
                                                                                              2020 
   
 
71 
 
nature of the same. In fact, unlike commercial arbitrations, where this question does not 
arise, based on a contractual relationship of a private nature, investment arbitrations involve 
a relationship not between equal entities, but a hierarchical relationship between governor 
and governed27. It follows, in fact, that arbitral tribunals are called to judge not only on the 
contractual rights and obligations existing between the parties, but also with reference to the 
obligations of a public nature weighing on sovereign state entities. 
Indeed, in the context of ICSID arbitration, it frequently happens that the Courts, in 
examining the specific case, have the task of reviewing and controlling the exercise of 
powers expressing state sovereignty. This aspect, which can also be seen in the WTO dispute 
resolution system, takes on particular characteristics due to both the nature of the body 
called to judge the matter and with reference to the parties involved. The consideration of 
the ad hoc creation of the arbitration panel called to resolve the single and specific 
controversy devolved, whose components, moreover, are generally chosen directly by the 
parties involved, together with the non-existence of a constraint of the previous one, as well 
as the absence of an appeal mechanism, led to the adoption of considerably different 
approaches in the investigation of the national measure, by the ICSID courts. The nature of 
the opposing parties, public the one and private the other, has added, according to some 
theses, an element of disorientation in the definition of the matter with reference to the 
identification of the system, of an internal rather than an international nature, to which the 
arbitrators must refer, preventing the development of a constant and consistent review 
standard28. 
Through the ICSID dispute resolution mechanism, the control of the exercise of public 
powers in relation to investments has the potential to affect a wide range of economic 
activities. 
The investment treaties constitute the main guide for the identification of auditing standards 
aimed at protecting the investor from regulations or other types of state interference, with 
the consequence that it is through the reference to the same Bilateral Investment Treaty 
(BIT) that the courts judge the conduct of states29. Specifically, in order to protect 
investments, these treaties sometimes contain provisions aimed at delimiting or allowing 
state actions that interfere with the rights of investor. Their formulation, as well as the 
terminology used, constitute a guide for the arbitration panels that allows the identification 
of the revision standard applicable in the specific case. By applying the standards thus 
identified, the arbitrators define and limit state sovereignty, establishing the extent and ways 
in which the public authority can negatively interfere with investments. However, forecasts 
of this type are not always detectable within the Treaties. 
The analysis of the principle of proportionality in the investment field cannot be separated 
from its consideration as a revision standard, suitable for resolving conflicts between 
opposing interests of different nature that emerge in the investment discipline. The problem 
that arises concerns not so much the existence of the power to examine the national measure 
                                                 
27A. ROBERTS, The next battleground: Standards of review in investment treaty arbitration, in International Council for 
Commercial Arbitration Congress Series, 16, 2011, pp. 170, 174ss. E. SHIRLOW, Deference and indirect expropriation 
analysis in international investment law: observations on current approaches and frameworks for future analysis, in ICSID 
Review: Foreign Investment Law Journal, 29 (3), 2014, pp. 598ss. 
28W. BURKE-WHITE, A. VON STADEN, The need for public law standards of review in investor-State arbitrations, in 
S.W. SCHILL (ed.), International investment law and comparative public law, op. cit., pp. 689, 690ss. In the same opinion 
see also: G. VAN HARTEN, Investment treaty arbitration and public law, Oxford University Press, New York, 2007, pp. 70-
71. I.A. LAIRD, G.F. SOURGENS, T.J. WEILER, B. SABAHI, Investment treaty arbitration and international law, Juris 
Publishing, New York, 2015, pp. 215ss. 
29G. VAN HARTEN, Investment treaty arbitration and public law, op. cit., pp. 70-71. 
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in the arbitral tribunal, a power that cannot be denied because of the consent given by the 
State to submit the dispute to resolution in this manner, but rather to the delimitation the 
incisiveness of the same in order to avoid an excessive intrusion in areas properly 
attributable to state sovereignty. 
Since the concept of audit standard refers to the degree of scrutiny granted to the judging 
body in examining the measure adopted by a different body, in the context of investment 
arbitration it intrinsically involves a balance between ascertaining the fulfilment of 
obligations of international law enforcement and respect for its autonomy with specific 
reference to legislative power. In this regard, the definition of the concept of deference, 
understood as containment, put in place by the same body invested with the task of resolving 
the dispute, by issuing a judgment relating to the measure adopted by a different body, 
legitimated for this purpose30. The use of deference involves a reduction in the intensity of 
the review of the measure subject to scrutiny, with the consequent reduction in the 
interference of the judging body with the choices made at national level31. The former will 
limit its union to verifying compliance with internationally sanctioned requirements, without 
affecting the assessments made by state bodies. 
The power to make choices does not fall within the judgment body, but to judge those 
submitted to its scrutiny, within the limits of the powers that are attributed to it. 
The concept of deference is part of the proportional analysis as it delimits the investigation 
that can be conducted by arbitration courts. In the first place, the state public authority is 
recognized the discretionary power to choose the level of achievement of a legitimate 
objective and the decision-making ability of the choice made by the judicial body is 
excluded to the extent that the measure adopted is necessary for the identified purpose. 
Secondly, with reference to the existence of a plurality of measures that comply with the 
proportionality requirement, the assessments that led to the choice in favor of one by the 
national body do not also fall within the union of the arbitral tribunal. 
The existence of state discretion is implicit in the proportional analysis and also emerges 
with reference to ascertaining the effectiveness of the measure adopted by the State for the 
achievement of the legitimate objective according to the chosen level, in the event that there 
are a plurality of alternative measures equally effective for this purpose32. There are 
numerous pronouncements in which the ICSID Courts have delimited the intrusiveness of 
their analysis, sanctioning the non-unionization of choices made by the states, as they do not 
fall within the powers attributed to them. This deference appears not so much due to the 
simple acceptance of the judgment of others, but rather to the sufficient reliability of the 
assessment made by the body that adopted the measure itself33. It follows that recourse to 
the principle of proportionality does not exclude or contrast with the configurability of 
discretionary powers for states or even with the delimitation of the investigation carried out 
by the judging body due to the existence of non-negotiable choices by the latter. Also in light 
of the rulings of the arbitration courts, a gradation of intensity in the application of the 
principle of proportionality appears configurable. Such an approach makes it possible to 
                                                 
30C. HENCKELS, Proportionality and deference in investor-State arbitration, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2015, pp. 34-35. 
31J. RIVERS, Proportionality and variable intensity of review, in Cambridge Law Journal, 65, 2006, pp. 174ss. J. ARATO, 
The margin of appreciation in international investment law, in Virginia Journal of International Law, 54, 2014, pp. 545ss. D. 
PEAT, Comparative reasoning in international courts and tribunals, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2019, pp. 
113ss. 
32J. RIVERS, Proportionality and variable intensity of review, op. cit., pp. 199ss. 
33J. RIVERS, Proportionality and variable intensity of review, op. cit., pp. 204ss. 
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respond to the need, expressed by a thesis34,  to temper a totally deferential mechanism with 
the guarantee of procedural equality of the parties, as well as the protection of the rights 
previously granted to investors and the impartiality of the courts in the decision-making 
process. However, the boundary line between the different intensity in the application of the 
principle of proportionality and the configurability of a different revision standard does not 
appear so clear and uniform in doctrine. 
The issue of the audit standard applicable in the resolution of investment disputes, in fact, is 
opposed to the application of the principle of proportionality, the thesis of the margin of 
appreciation. The latter revision standard, according to a different approach, would be the 
best solution for the analysis that must be carried out by the ICSID Courts, as it offers a tool 
for the resolution of conflicts of rights and interests without placing the arbitration panel, 
created ad hoc, in the position of legislative power, through the attribution of the task of 
directly balancing or questioning that previously carried out by the national authorities. This 
gives the arbitral tribunal the appropriate space within which national authorities can take 
regulatory action without their respective decisions being questioned. The task of the 
arbitration panel would be limited to that of mere supervisor, aimed at checking that the 
exercise of state power remains within the configured margin and is sufficiently justified. 
However, albeit residually, the carrying out of a balance by the Court between state interests 
and interference with individual rights. The inadequacy of the principle of proportionality in 
the ICSID arbitration is justified by the lack of legislative capacity in the courts to conduct a 
direct balance, as well as knowledge, skills and resources that allow to question national 
choices, also considering the non-rooting of the same judging body within the regulatory, 
political and social context whose policies are subject to judgment. Otherwise, the Panels 
that decide at first instance the WTO disputes are not only rooted and created specifically 
within the multilateral system of trade, but, moreover, the function they perform is precisely 
that of guaranteeing the conformity of national measures with the WTO agreements to which 
states have joined. Although the Panels are also created specifically for the resolution of the 
specific controversy that has arisen, they are part of a uniform and univocal international 
regulatory framework, ensuring knowledge of the defined context in which they operate. 
The last consideration could be limited, first of all, in the light of the analysis carried out 
with reference to the composition and choice of the ICSID Courts arbitrators, underlining in 
particular the possibility for the parties to select judges with the appropriate skills needed 
with reference to the concrete case. Secondly, the structure itself and the nature of the 
proportional analysis allow the judging body to have a pre-established tool available that 
does not prevent the attribution and performance of functions attributable to national 
legislative power35. 
In fact, one of the main arguments in favor of the use of proportional analysis as the standard 
of revision in investment disputes is identified in the characteristic of the principle of 
allowing the rationalization of the decision-making process by predetermining an analytical 
structure that allows delimiting the reasoning and arguments36. 
In addition, the application of the same principle allows to make explicit value judgments, 
simultaneously reducing the perception of an ideological predisposition of the judging body, 
as well as increasing the transparency of the decision by using the same motivational 
                                                 
34A. ROBERTS, The next battleground: Standards of review in investment treaty arbitration, op. cit., pp. 180ss. 
35A. ROBERTS, The next battleground: Standards of review in investment treaty arbitration, op. cit., pp. 182ss. 
36A. STONE SWEET, Investor-State arbitration: Proportionality’s new frontier, in Law & Ethics of Human Rights, 4, 2010, 
pp. 46, 76ss. M. SORNARASAH, Resistance and change in the international law on foreign investment, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2015. 
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scheme. The criticality that emerges in the application of this standard is the excessive 
discretion that the use of the principle of proportionality risks configuring for the arbitrators 
in carrying out the judgment of values relating to the definition of the concrete case, due to 
its structure. 
From a substantial point of view, moreover, the principle of proportionality, including a 
certain degree of deference, also constitutes a rational tool for optimizing the interests that 
come into play in the delicate relationship between state sovereignty and the protection of 
investments, guaranteeing respect for the division of competences between national bodies 
and arbitrators called to resolve the dispute. The reference to the deference in the application 
of this principle is appropriate due to the involvement of value judgments or particularly 
sensitive or controversial issues in the analysis of the measure37. The extent of the degree of 
deference depends on the nature of the question submitted to arbitration and therefore 
requires a case-by-case assessment, in line with the operating mechanism of the principle of 
proportionality. 
 
5.The use of proportionality in the resolution of WTO disputes 
 
In the WTO system, the subject of disputes submitted to the Panels and, at second instance, 
to the AB, measures can be taken individually by the Member States. The proportionality 
principle plays an important role in the resolution of disputes according to the WTO system. 
In fact, it provides the body involved in the matter with an application method for resolving 
issues where conflicting principles, interests or values are raised which are not linked by a 
hierarchical relationship, but which have their origin on different regulatory levels. In order 
to resolve the controversial issue, it follows the need for the judging body to make choices 
that directly affect the values involved, attributing to them different relevance in terms of 
balances made by the same. 
The proportionality principle provides a method that allows the Panels to address and 
resolve the dispute, not only ensuring transparency in the analysis carried out, but also 
allowing to rationally justify the preference given to certain values or interests and 
consequently increasing the coherence of the multilateral trading system38. 
Even within the WTO system there are conflicting opinions regarding the principle being 
analyzed. A certain skepticism that cannot be shared, in fact, leads some to affirm the 
absence of a general requirement of proportionality in WTO law, nor of a generic test 
applicable by the respective dispute resolution bodies39. The reasons for this thesis are 
primarily related to the fear of attributing excessive power to the international judge, as well 
as to the intrusion that such an analysis would produce towards autonomy and state 
sovereignty40. Proportionality would be one of the fundamental principles that form the basis 
                                                 
37C. HENCKELS, Proportionality and deference in investor-State arbitration, op. cit., pp. 38ss. 
38M. ANDENAS, S. ZLEPTNIG, Proportionality: WTO law in comparative perspective, op. cit., pp. 426ss. 
39J. NEUMANN, E. TÜRK, Necessity revisited: Proportionality in World Trade Organization law after Korea-Beef, EC-
Asbestos and EU-Sardines, in Journal of World Trade, 37, 2003, pp. 200ss. M. SORNARASAH, Resistance and change in 
the international law o foreign investment, op. cit. 
40G. MARCEAU, J. TRACHTMAN, The technical barriers to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: A map of the World Trade Organization law of domestic 
regulation of goods, in Journal of World Trade, 36, 2002, pp. 811ss. G. KAPTERIAN, A critique of the WTO jurisprudence 
on “necessity” in The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 59 (2), 2010, pp. 98ss. G. CARLONE, An added 
exception to the TBT agreement after Clovew, Tuna II and Cool, in Boston College International and Comparative Law 
Review., 37 (1), 2014, pp. 108ss. 
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of the multilateral trading system41. This principle should govern the interpretation and 
application of the WTO law as it allows to obtain the correct relationship between the 
different interests involved. 
Another thesis, differently, believes that the balance of rights, principles, values and interests 
within the WTO system is a fact that cannot be avoided42. The question, if any, concerns the 
modality with which to undertake this balance: The existing relationship between the 
different principles and values enshrined in the WTO agreements is relative; it follows that 
proportional analysis constitutes a method through whose application it is possible to 
achieve a balance between the different competing objectives. The need to perform a 
balancing operation would also emerge directly from some rules contained in the 
agreements, first of all the provision of article XX of the GATT43. Although the concept of 
proportionality as such is not mentioned, according to this thesis, it supports and inspires 
many of the specific rules of the WTO agreements. 
According to the opinion mentioned above, the principle under examination would be 
applied in two possible ways: As a general principle of international law, it inspires the 
interpretation of individual provisions of the agreements; secondly, it constitutes a specific 
obligation enshrined in WTO rules requiring balances, as well as the entrustment to it in 
order to determine obligations for Member States44. According to this view, the principle of 
proportionality is part of the WTO system, but would need to a definition of its structure in 
such a way as to allow consistency and make the procedure more rational and predictable. 
The further effect that would be achieved in this way is the limitation of the discretion of the 
judicial bodies, through the use of a predetermined structure of the decision-making 
procedure. 
Although the principle of proportionality, in accordance with the thesis mentioned above, 
appears to permeate the entire system of agreements that regulates multilateral trade within 
the WTO, it is possible to identify some well-defined sectors in which it is most specifically 
focused: the suspension of concessions, the general exceptions enshrined in article XX 
GATT45, the Agreement relating to sanitary and phytosanitary measures and the one 
governing technical barriers to trade (SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT 
Agreements). Specifically, the investigations of these four sectors, in addition to constituting 
illustrative examples that allow the examination of the different elements and the 
consideration of the approaches to proportionality developed by the WTO jurisprudence in 
the application of the agreements, also allow the carrying out of a comparative analysis of 
the configuration the proportionality principle in the multilateral trading system and in the 
investment sector, which will be examined below. 
 
6.The suspension of concessions 
 
                                                 
41M. HILF, Power, rules and principles-which orientation for WTO/GATT Law?, in Journal of International Economic Law, 
4, 2001, pp. 111ss. A. GOURGOURINIS, Equity and equitable principles in the World Trade Organization. Addressing 
conflicts and overlaps between the WTO and other regimes, ed. Routledge, London & New York,. 2015. A. SLADE, The 
objectives and principles of the WTO TRIPS agreement. A detailed anatomy, in Osgoode Hall law Journal, 53 (3), 2016, 
pp. 952ss. C. CARMODY, Theory and theoretical approaches to WTO law, in Manchester Journal of International 
Economic Law, 13 (2), 2016. 
42M. ANDENAS, S. ZLEPTNIG, Proportionality: WTO law in comparative perspective, op. cit., pp. 424ss. 
43C.J. CHENG, A new international legal order, ed. Brill, The Hague, 2016. 
44M. ANDENAS, S. ZLEPTNIG, Proportionality: WTO law in comparative perspective, op. cit., pp. 426ss. 
45Q. GUANGLIN, The balance between “public morals” and trade liberalization: Analysis of the application of article XX 
(a) of the GATT in the EC-SEAL products dispute, in Amsterdam Law Forum, 10 (2), 2018. 
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The proportionality principle plays a key role in countermeasures. The purpose of adopting a 
countermeasure in international law is to induce the party who committed the offense to 
comply with its obligations, ceasing the behavior contrary to them. International law, in fact, 
prohibits arbitrary or excessive countermeasures due to the damage suffered and the 
seriousness of the offense. The proportionality principle acts as a tool for controlling the 
exercise of decentralized power conferred on States to react individually to illegal acts at the 
international level46. According to international law, the determination of proportionality 
must be carried out on the basis of two elements: One quantity determined by the damage 
suffered, one qualitative connected to the seriousness of the offense and the rights involved. 
A similar purpose is recognized for countermeasures also in the context of the WTO 
system47. In this system, the same receive a specific discipline that differs from that provided 
for by customary international law. The first difference is terminological: the Agreement for 
the resolution of disputes within the WTO does not use the term countermeasures, but 
"suspension of concessions". Although in practice the coincidence between the two 
measures is affirmed, the diversity of the terminology used does not constitute a merely 
literary datum48. 
In fact, in this regard, the consideration of paragraph 4 of article 22 DSU is relevant, where 
these measures are regulated. In prescribing that the level of suspension of concessions must 
be equivalent to the level of cancellation or compromise, the provision indicates what are the 
elements that must be considered in authorizing such suspension. Therefore, the irrelevance 
of both the seriousness of the offense and the rights involved is evident. In fact, no gradation 
of the violation committed is carried out within the WTO; therefore, the seriousness of the 
offense does not affect the level of the countermeasures. Otherwise, the concept of "level of 
nullification or impairment" appears to be attributable to the consideration of the damage 
suffered by the State that undergoes the violation, which is a central element of the analysis. 
Secondly, the relationship between the violation committed and the countermeasure is 
indicated in terms of equivalence, unlike the provision contained in the draft article 
regarding the responsibility of states49. 
The question that emerges is the possibility of tracing the assessment of the equivalence 
requirement, required by the rule governing countermeasures, to the application of the 
                                                 
46E. CANNIZZARO, The role of proportionality in the law of international countermeasures, in European Journal of 
International Law, 12, 2001, pp. 889, 916ss.  T.M. FRANK, On proportionality of countermeasures in international law, in 
American Journal of International Law, 102 (4), 2008, pp. 717ss. A. KULICK, Global public interest in international 
investment law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012, pp. 180ss. 
47P. MAVROIDIS, Remedies in the WTO legal system:  Between a rock and a hard place, European Journal of International 
Law, 11, 2000, pp. 763ss. A. DESMEDT, Proportionality in WTO law, in Journal of International Economic Law, 4, 2001, 
pp. 441-447. D. LOURIC, Deference to the legislature in WTO challenges to legislation, Kluwer Law International, New 
York, 2010, pp. 56ss. 
48See European Community-Regime for Importation, Sales and Distribution of Bananas (EC-Bananas III), WT/DS27/ARB, 
Recourse to Arbitration by the European Community under Art. 22.6 of the DSU, 9 April 1999, para. 6.3. For further details 
see: H. RUIZ-FABRI, The relationship between negotiations and third-party dispute settlement at the WTO, with an 
emphasis on the EC-Bananas dispute, in L. BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES et al. (eds), Diplomatic and judicial means of 
dispute settlement, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2013, pp. 88ss. S. SHLOMO AGON, Non-compliance recognition 
and justice in international adjudication: WTO perspective, in Global Constitutionalism 5 (2), 2016 pp. 240ss. M. 
TREBILOCK, R. HOWSE, A. ELIASON, The regulation of international trade, ed. Routledge, London & New York, 2013, 
pp. 820ss. A. BAHRI, Public-private partnership of WTO dispute settlement. Enabling developing countries, Edward Elgar 
Publishers, Cheltenham, 2018. 
49For further details see also: C. AHLBORN, Remedies against International Organizations. A relational account of 
international responsibility, in K. WALLENS, Remedies and responsibility for the actions of international organizations, ed. 
Brill,  Hague, 2014, pp. 545ss. M. FORTEAU, Régime général de responsabilité ou lex specialis?, in Revue Belge de Droit 
International, 117 (1), 2013,  pp. 147-160. K. KLEIN, Les articles sur la responsabilité des organisations internationales: 
quel bilan tirer des travaux de la CDI?, in Annuaire Français de Droit International, 58, 2012, pp. 15ss. 
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scheme envisaged by the proportional analysis. To this question, a first thesis gave a 
negative answer, in the light of the literary data: The countermeasures adopted following the 
provisions of the DSU must be equivalent, rather than proportionate, to the commercial 
damage that occurred as a result of the default. It follows that the relevance of the principle 
of proportionality in the context of countermeasures according to customary international 
law is not reflected in the discipline dictated by the DSU in international trade50. However, 
this opinion believes that the principle of proportionality maintains its own function in the 
context under analysis, as an interpretative criterion in the light of which the DSU rules must 
be read, in order to avoid conflicts with the discipline dictated by customary international 
law51. 
A different thesis answers the question in the affirmative, considering the requirement of 
equivalence as representative of the principle of proportionality within the DSU. The 
principle in analysis would be found in the concrete comparison between the level of 
suspension of concessions and the level of cancellation or compromise, in order to allow the 
identification of the equivalence relationship between the two terms52. It follows that the 
character that this relationship assumes is more focused on the quantitative element, rather 
than on the qualitative factor, unlike what is prescribed with reference to countermeasures in 
international law. 
A consequence that derives from the discipline dictated by the provision of the DSU leads to 
the exclusion of the possibility of authorizing states to adopt punitive countermeasures, due 
to the requirement of equivalence requested53. Already at a first reading, it is clear that the 
discipline of countermeasures dictated by the DSU is more precise than that prescribed by 
customary international law. 
The concept of equivalence pursuant to article 22.4 DSU was addressed by the first 
arbitration panel established pursuant to article 22.6 DSU, in the EC-Bananas III (US) 
case54. In their analysis, the referees adopted a rigorous approach, considering the 
connotating term "a correspondence, identity or balance between two related levels", that is, 
the level of concessions that must be suspended and that of cancellation or compromise55. 
Specifically, it distinguishes the term under analysis from that of "appropriateness" 
envisaged in the previous formulation of the 1947 GATT, believing that the ordinary 
meaning of "equivalent" implies a greater degree of correspondence, identity or rigorous 
balance between the two levels indicated with respect to what is required by 
appropriateness. 
Furthermore, in confirming the meaning attributed to the term in the aforementioned 
                                                 
50A. DESMEDT, Proportionality in WTO law, op. cit., pp. 450ss. J. PAUWELYN, Enforcement and countermeasures in the 
WTO: Rules are rules, in The American Journal of International Law, 94 (2), 2000, pp. 335-341. R. RAJESH BABU, 
Remedies under the WTO legal system, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 2012. W.J. DAVEY, The WTO dispute 
settlement system: How have developing countries is fared?, in Z. DRABEK, Is the World Trade Organization attractive 
enough for emerging economies?, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2010, pp. 298ss. 
51A. DESMEDT, Proportionality in WTO law, op. cit.,  pp. 450ss. 
52S. SHADIKHODJAEV, Retaliation in the WTO Dispute Settlement System, Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, The 
Netherland, 2009. 
53A. DESMEDT, Proportionality in WTO law, op. cit., pp. 448ss. S. SHADIKHODJAEV, Retaliation in the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System, op., cit., United States-Transitional Safeguard Measure on Combed Cotton yarn form Pakistan (US-
Cotton  Yarn), WT/DS192/AB/R, Report of the Appellate Body, 8 October 2001, para. 120. 
54G.Z. MARCEAU, Open hearings in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism: The current state of play, in F. 
BELLANGER, J. DE WERRA, Genève au confluent du droit interne et du droit international: Mélanges offerts par la 
Faculté de droit de l'Université de Genève à la Société suisse des juristes à l'occasion du congrès 2012, ed. Schulthess, 
Zurich, 2012. pp. 112ss. 
55EC-Bananas III, Art. 22.6 Arbitration Report, para. 4.1 and 6.5. 
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pronunciation, the arbitrators involved in the suspension request in the EC-Hormones case 
also believe that the provision of article 22.4 DSU requires the determination of the 
equivalence ratio in a quantitative and non-qualitative sense56. 
The arbitration panel established pursuant to article 22.6 in the US-1916 Act (EC), 
summarizes the interpretation of the concept, believing that the suspension level appears to 
meet the requirement of equivalence, pursuant to article 22.4 DSU, if it is equal to or below 
the level of cancellation or impairment of the benefit, therefore limiting it to the damage 
suffered by the applicant who invokes the suspension57. If, otherwise, it exceeds the 
indicated level, the suspension assumes a punitive nature and, therefore, is inconsistent with 
article 22.4 DSU58. 
The equivalence requirement was also interpreted by the arbitration panel, established 
pursuant to article 22.6 DSU, in the US-Gambling case59. Starting from the consideration of 
the function of the countermeasures to induce the State to fulfil its obligations, since the 
suspension of the concessions cannot be authorized beyond what is equivalent to the level of 
cancellation or compromise, the arbitrators believe that article 22.4 DSU "requires a degree 
of "correspondence or identity" between the level of the suspension to be authorized and the 
level of the nullification or impairment of benefits"60. Therefore, there would appear to be 
no room for any flexibility in ascertaining the relationship. The two terms of the comparison 
are clearly identified, the relationship between which must be correspondence or identity. In 
determining this equivalence, the arbitrators believe that they must ensure that the level of 
suspension is not lower than the level of cancellation or impairment of the benefit against 
the appellant, so as to prejudice his rights, nor exceed this level, since in this way the 
suspension would be punitive61. The application of the equivalence standard, therefore, leads 
to excluding the use of the principle of proportionality. 
The general provisions for the suspension of concessions from the understanding are subject 
to an exception constituted by the regime concerning the prohibited or punishable subsidies, 
according to the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures-SCM Agreement. 
The requirement prescribed by this Agreement for the adoption of countermeasures, in fact, 
consists not so much of equivalence, but of appropriateness. Unlike article 22.4 DSU, the 
provision contained in article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement takes up the formulation of GATT 
1947. 
                                                 
56European Community-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (EC-Hormones (US)), WT/DS26/ARB, Recourse 
to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU, Decision by the Arbitrators, 12 July 1999, para. 20. For 
further analysis see also: P. VAN DEN BOSSCHE, W. ZDOUC, The law and policy of the WTO, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2013. M. MATSUHITA, T.J. SCHOENBAUM, P.C. MAVROIDIS, The World Trade Organization. Law, 
practice, and policy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, pp. 5ss. C. HEIDFELD, Die denzentrale Durchsetzung des 
WTO-Rechts in der EU, ed. Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2012.   
57United Stated-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US-1916 Act (EU)), WT/DS136/ARB, Recourse to Arbitration by the  United 
States under Article 22.6 of the DSU, Decision by the Arbitrators, 24 February 2004, para. 5.21. Y. NGANGJOH HODU, 
Theories and practices of compliance with WTO law, Kluwer Law International, New York, 2012. 
58R. WOLFRUM, P.T. STOLL, A. SEIBERT-FOHR (eds), WTO-Technical barriers and SPS measures, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden-Boston, 2007. M. HERDEGEN, Principles of international economic law, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2016. A. BARRIOS VILLARREAL, International standardization and the agreement on technical barriers to trade, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2016. 
59United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (US-Gambling), 
WT/DS285/ARB, Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU, Decision by the Arbitrator, 
21 December 2007. S.E. ROLLAND, D.M.TRUBEK, Emerging powers in the international economic order. Cooperation, 
competition and transformation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2019. N. PIRES DE CARVALHO, The TRIPS 
regime of trademarks and designs, Kluwer Law International, New York, 2018. 
60US-Gambling, Art. 22.6 Arbitration Report, para. 2.7. 
61US-Gambling, Art. 22.6 Arbitration Report, para. 3.24. 
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Recourse to the principle of proportionality in the last-mentioned rule cannot be denied, also 
considering the content of the explanatory note included in the Agreement where it is 
specified that the term used is not intended to allow countermeasures "disproportionate in 
light of the fact that subsidies dealt with under this provision are prohibited"62. 
The term used in the SCM Agreement allows less rigor in determining the countermeasure 
with respect to the equivalence requirement prescribed by the DSU, although even in this 
case the discipline does not reflect the provisions of customary international law, with 
reference to the proportionality of the same to the seriousness of the violation shop assistant. 
According to a thesis, the principle of proportionality would be comparable with the 
standard prescribed by the SCM Agreement63. The provision contained therein, in fact, 
establishes respect for a relationship that can be assimilated more closely to the proportional 
one, rather than that of equivalence required in the DSU. In light of this consideration, this 
opinion comes to affirm the greater similarity of the requirement of appropriateness with the 
principle of proportionality prescribed for countermeasures in international law. However, 
the requirement of article 4.10 SCM would not respond to both elements required by 
customary international law, i.e. quantitative and qualitative, but to only one of the two, due 
to the type of approach used: The first if we consider the economic effect and commercial 
damage to the subsidy, the second if the reference is to its amount, therefore to the 
seriousness of the damage and the nature of the rights and obligations involved. However, 
this requirement would depart from the principle of proportionality enshrined in the ILC 
articles due to the greater discretion granted in its assessment by the use of negative 
terminology used by the note to the standard of the SCM Agreement. 
According to a different thesis, on the contrary, even the requirement of appropriateness 
would not allow its assessment on the basis of the proportional analysis scheme, if not to the 
extent that the former contains the risk of a disproportionate countermeasure in the event 
that a plurality of complaints are involved64. 
Nonetheless, in the Brazil-Aircraft case, where the matter was expressly considered, the 
need was confirmed that the terms "equivalent" used in the DSU and "appropriate" 
prescribed in the SCM Agreement have a different meaning. With specific reference to the 
second requirement, "a countermeasure remains" appropriate "as long as it is not 
disproportionate, having also regard to the fact that the measure at issue is a prohibited 
subsidy"65. The other relevant aspect that is underlined in the pronunciation mentioned, 
properly pertains to the identification of the meaning to be attributed to the term 
"appropriate": First of all, through the application of article 31 of Vienna Convention on 
Law of Treaties (VCLT)66, the body considers it appropriate to refer to the definition of 
                                                 
62Accord SCM, Art. 4.10.With similar terminology also with reference to the provision of the following paragraph of the 
same article, indicating the task of the arbitrators invested with the question of determining the appropriateness of the 
countermeasure pursuant to Article 22.6 DSU. 
63S. SHADIKHODJAEV, Retaliation in the WTO Dispute Settlement System, op. cit., pp. 43-44. 
64A. DESMEDT, Proportionality in WTO law, op. cit., pp. 452ss. 
65Brazil-Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil-Aircraft), WT/DS46/ARB, Recourse to Arbitration by Brazil 
under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, Decision by the Arbitrators, 28 August 2000, para 
3.51. M. MATSUHITA, T.J. SCHOENBAUM, P.C. MAVROIDIS, The World Trade Organization. Law, practice, and 
policy, op. cit. 
66For further analysis see also: G. NOUTE, Treaties and subsequent practice, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, pp. 
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Law of Treaties, 30 years on, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 2010, pp. 9ss. G. NOUTE, Treaties and subsequent practice, op. 
cit., pp. 224ss. E. BJORGE, The evolutionary interpretation of treaties, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014. O. 
CORTEN, P. KLEIN, The Vienna Conventions on the law of treaties. A commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
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countermeasure in general international law and, specifically, to the work carried out by the 
International Law Commission relating to  states responsibility67. Since the 
countermeasures, on the basis of the aforementioned rules, are aimed at inducing the State 
that committed the offense to fulfil its obligations, a countermeasure is appropriate inter alia 
"if it effectively induces compliance"68. It follows that, in the application of article 4.7 of the 
SCM Agreement, effectively inducing compliance means causing the withdrawal of the 
prohibited subsidy69. Therefore, according to the referees, the level of the countermeasure 
simply corresponds to the level of the subsidy which must be withdrawn. Requiring, 
however, that the countermeasure is equivalent to the level of cancellation or compromise 
would be contrary to the principle of effectiveness, since it would significantly limit the 
effect of the former in the case of prohibited grants. 
It seems possible to configure the existence of a proportionality relationship between the 
amount of the grant and the level of the countermeasure, also due to a further consideration 
made by the referees. In fact, in considering that a countermeasure assumes a punitive 
character if it is not intended only to induce the State to fulfilment, but contains the 
additional purpose aimed at sanctioning the action put in place by the latter, the college 
excludes this qualification with reference to the concrete case considering not to detect a 
disproportion in the calculation of its appropriateness70. 
In light of the two references made by the arbitrators to the concept under analysis, 
therefore, the connection and relevance of the principle of proportionality with reference to 
ascertaining the requirement of the appropriateness of the countermeasure within the scope 
of the SCM Agreement appears undeniable. 
This relevance emerges more clearly in the subsequent arbitration ruling relating to the US-
FSC case. It is already with reference to the literal meaning of "appropriate" that there is a 
connection with the principle of proportionality: The term refers to something that is 
"suitable" or "adapted to a use or purpose", suitability which also constitutes a structural 
element of the proportional analysis71.  According to the referees, this reference introduces 
an element of flexibility since it requires that the countermeasure be adapted to the specific 
concrete case. 
In consideration of the term "disproportionate" present in the note to article 4.10, after 
affirming that the expression used suggests the lack of an appropriate relationship between 
two elements, the college believes that it does not imply a mathematically exact equation but 
"soundly enough to respect the relative proportion at issue "in order to avoid manifest 
imbalances or inconsistencies, without, however, requiring an exact equivalence:" the 
relationship to be respected is precisely that of "proportion" rather than  of "equivalence"72. 
This analysis therefore appears to confirm the relevance of the principle of proportionality in 
                                                                                                                                                      
Convention on the Law of Treaties. A commentary, Springer, Heidelberg-New York 2012, pp. 536ss. M. SAMSO, High 
hopes, scant resources: A word of scepticism about the anti-fragmentation function of article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, in Leiden Journal of International Law, 24, 2011, pp. 5ss. R. GARDINER, Treaty 
Interpretation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008. 
67K. KLEIN, Les articles sur la responsabilité des organisations internationales: quel bilan tirer des travaux de la CDI?, op. 
cit. 
68G. NOUTE, Treaties and subsequent practice, op. cit. 
69Brazil -Aircraft, Art. 22.6 Arbitration Report, para. 3.42-3.45, 3.58. 
70Brazil-Aircraft, Art. 22.6 Arbitration Report, para. 3.55. 
71United States-Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations” (US-FCS), WT/DS108/ARB, Recourse to  Arbitration by 
the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, Decision of the Arbitrator, 30 
August 2002, para. 5.9. S. CHARNOVITZ, The path for world trade law in the 21st century, World Scientific Publishing, 
Singapore, 2014, pp. 208ss. 
72US-FCS, Art. 22.6 Arbitration Report, para. 5.18, 5.26. 
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the determination of countermeasures, although the same arbitrators emphasize the less 
rigidity of the approach due to the negative formulation of the requirement: "It does not 
require strict proportionality". 
The conclusions made in the two arbitration decisions just mentioned are entirely taken up 
by the arbitration panel in the Canada-Aircraft Credits and Guarantees case, confirming in 
particular the position of the arbitrators of the US-FSC case: In ascertaining the 
appropriateness of the countermeasure pursuant to article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement, the 
college believes it must ensure that it is not disproportionate73. 
From the analysis of the requirement required to obtain authorization for the adoption of 
countermeasures, therefore, it appears possible to affirm the relevance of the principle of 
proportionality not so much in general, but rather in consideration of the requirement of 
appropriateness prescribed by article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement, as an exception to the 
provision contained in the DSU. Although, however, also in light of the jurisprudence, the 
negative wording of the note included in the SCM Agreement, necessarily leads to the 
adoption of a less rigid approach to this principle. 
 
7.General exceptions pursuant to article XX GATT 
 
Article XX of the GATT provides a list of general exceptions to the obligations imposed on 
states, enshrined in the Agreement. This provision is crucial for States to be able to put in 
place protective measures implementing national policies, per se in violation of international 
obligations, but which end up being compliant with GATT by virtue of their traceability to 
one of the exceptions governed by the mentioned article. The provision thus allows States to 
decide that certain policies, falling within those indicated, take precedence over the 
objective of liberalizing trade74. 
In any case, in order to be justified under article XX75,the national measure must meet the 
conditions sanctioned by it. In order to ascertain this fulfilment, a two-step method has been 
developed: The first checks whether the measure falls within one of the areas of the 
exceptions indicated, ascertaining its necessity if it is prescribed by the relevant provision; 
the second concerns the assessment of its application in accordance with the introductory 
cap of the forecast76. 
Although the right of a WTO Member State to adopt a specific public policy and to choose 
the level of protection or implementation of the same has never been questioned77, the 
margin of discretion attributed with reference to the assessment of the appropriateness of the 
purpose however, it finds a limitation in the need for it to fall among those listed in article 
XX78. 
                                                 
73Canada-Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional Aircraft (Canada-Aircraft Credits and Guarantees), 
WT/DS222/ARB, Recourse to Arbitration by Canada under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM 
Agreement, Decision by the Arbitrators, 17 February 2003, para. 3.14. W. MÜLLER, WTO agreement on subsidies and 
counter-railing measures. A commentary, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017. 
74R. WOLFRUM, P.T. STOLL, A. SEIBERT-FOHR (eds), WTO-Technical barriers and SPS measures, op. cit., pp. 455ss. 
75I.C. SALINAS ALCARAZ, The concept of necessity under the GATT and national regulatory autonomy, in Revista 
Virtual: Via Inveniendi et Iudicandi, 10 (2), 2015, pp. 79ss. R. WOLFRUM, P.T. STOLL, H. HESTERMEYER, WTO trade 
in goods, ed. Brill, The Hague, 2010. 
76United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US-Gasoline), WT/DS2/AB/R, Report of the 
Appellate Body, 20 May 1996, p. 22. A.R. MAGGIO, Environmental policy, non product related process and production 
methods and the law of the World Trade Organisation, ed. Springer, Berlin, 2017. 
77European Community-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products (EC- Asbestos), 
WT/DS135/AB/R, Report of the Appellate Body, 12 March 2001, para. 168. 
78N. MOSUNOVA, Are non trade values adequately protected under GATT Art. XX?, in Russian Law Journal, 2 (2), 2014. 
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The relevance of the principle of proportionality in considering article XX appears 
configurable with reference to the need to identify the relationship between the purpose to 
which the measure is achieved and the measure itself79. This phase, subsequent to 
ascertaining the justification of the measure with one of the exceptions provided, coincides 
with one of the four elements through which the proportionality principle is applied. 
The list provided in the text of the article under analysis contains a distinction: There are 
measures that must be necessary in order to protect the specific objective indicated, others 
must be "related to", or even "imposed for", "in pursuance of", "involving" or  be 
"essential"80. This terminological difference necessarily involves a different approach in 
considering the individual measures submitted to judgment, depending on the purpose for 
which they are directed. For the purposes of this discussion, the consideration of the first 
two hypotheses mentioned appears to be relevant. 
Measures that are aimed at protecting public morality (let. A), human, animal or plant life 
(lett. B) must be necessary, to ensure compliance with laws or regulations not contrary to the 
agreement itself (let. d). 
On the contrary, it is sufficient that the measures are related to the objective if they are 
related to the import or export of gold or silver, to prison labour products and, to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources. 
 
8.The necessary measures 
 
The need for the measure, in the application of article XX, has been addressed by the WTO 
jurisprudence in particular with reference to letters b) and d). The ruling of the first instance 
body of the US-Gasoline case defines the concept of necessity, pursuant to the forecast in 
analysis, by means of a formulation that appears similar to that prescribed for the 
corresponding element of the proportional analysis. Recalling the decision made with 
reference to the US-Section 33781 case and confirmed in the Thai Cigarettes case prior to the 
adoption of GATT 1994, the Panel states that "if there where consistent or less inconsistent 
measures reasonably available to the United States, the requirement to demonstrate necessity 
would not have been met"82. The compliance with the requirement of necessity is 
determined considering the existence of alternative measures that comply with or are not in 
accordance with the obligations prescribed by GATT, which could reasonably be adopted by 
the State for the achievement of the objective indicated by the relevant forecast. The 
verification of the existence of alternatives implies that the measure cannot be justified in 
light of the exceptions sanctioned by article XX83. 
However, this formulation has undergone an evolution and completion in the light of the 
                                                 
79M. ANDENAS, S. ZLEPTNIG, Proportionality: WTO law in comparative perspective, op. cit., pp. 410ss. 
80Art. XX GATT, lett. A-j. For further details see: N. MORAN, The first twenty cases under GATT article XX: Tuna or 
Shrimp dear?, in G. ADINOLFI, F. BAETENS, J. CAIARDO, A. LUPONE, A. MICARA, International economic law, ed. 
Springer, Berlin, 2017, pp. 14ss. M. CHI, Exhaustable natural resource in WTO law: GATT article XX (g) disputes and 
their implications, in Journal of World Trade, 48 (5), 2014, pp. 942ss. S.W. ANDEMARIAM, Can (should) article XX (b) 
GATT be a defense against inconsistencies with the SPS and TBT agreements?, in The Journal of World Investment & 
Trade, 7 (4), 2006, pp. 320ss. 
81U.S-Section 337 of the Tariff act of 1930 report by the panel adopted on 7 November 1989 (L/6430-365/345) of 16 
January 1989. See also: Y. YU, L. ZHANG, Analysis of enforcement of section 337 of the US Tariff act through 
perspectives in law and economics, in Journal of Intellectual Property Rights, 17, 2012, pp. 210ss. 
82United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US-Gasoline), WT/DS2/R, Report of the Panel, 29 
January 1996, para. 6.24. 
83A. FOLLESDAL, G. ULFSTEIN, The judicalization of international law: A mixed blessing?, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2018. 
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ruling of the Appellate Body in the Korea-Beef case. The interpretation of the requirement 
of necessity, carried out in the light of article 31 VCLT84, has as its starting point the literal 
meaning of the term: "Normally it denotes something that cannot be dispensed with or done 
without, requisite, essential, needful". However the expression must be considered in  
connection with which it is used, since it is susceptible of different meanings85. In the light 
of the context in which the term "necessary" is inserted, the measures that are indispensable 
or absolutely necessary are certainly considered to meet the requirement. inevitable for the 
achievement of the goal. Although "the term necessary refers (...) to a range of degrees of 
necessity"86, so that measures that simply "contribute" to it are also included. 
In particular, the Appellate Body believes that the assessment of the existence of the 
requirement under analysis pursuant to letter d) of article XX87, must also be made taking 
into consideration the importance of the common interests or values that the law or the 
regulation that must be carried out is aimed at protecting. The more vital or important the 
former, the easier it is to accept the measure designed for their implementation88. In addition, 
the court continues, that there are other aspects that must be considered, such as the extent to 
which the measure contributes to the achievement of the aim pursued and the extent of the 
restrictive effects of international trade produced. The need for the measure appears to be 
determined mainly on the basis of a quantitative criterion, based on the restriction of trade 
caused by it, rather than on the degree of compliance with the WTO agreements89. 
The aforementioned pronunciation expressly refers to the "weighing and balancing" 
procedure typical of the application of the proportional analysis. In fact, the present case is 
the cornerstone of the reconstruction of the principle of proportionality applied within the 
WTO dispute resolution system, on which those theses that believe it constitutes one of the 
foundations of the multilateral trading system are based90. Taking a further step with respect 
to what was stated in the aforementioned rulings, according to the Appellate Body, the 
determination of the availability of an alternative measure compliant with WTO law or less 
restrictive, the adoption of which can reasonably be carried out by the State, includes the 
balancing procedure91. 
The interpretation of this formulation has been elaborated by the GATT Secretariat, which 
considered that the requirement prescribed by article XX has evolved from "a least-trade 
restrictive approach to a less-trade restrictive one, supplemented with a proportionality 
test”92, the latter defined as a process of balancing a series of factors. 
If on the one hand the last mentioned ruling involves an attenuation of the rigidity in 
ascertaining the requirement of necessity, on the other the balance that is described ends up 
giving the dispute resolution bodies a more invasive role in assessing the legitimacy of the 
measure subject to the procedure, requiring them to assess the relevance of interests and 
                                                 
84R. GARDINER, Treaty Interpretation, op. cit. 
85Korea-measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef (Korea-Beef), WT/DS161/AB/R and 
WT/DS169/AB/R, Report of the Appellate Body, 11 December 2000, para. 160-161. 
86WT/DS169/AB/R, Report of the Appellate Body, op. cit. 
87F. BAETENS, J. CAIARDO, Frontiers of international economic law: Legal tools to confront interdisciplinary challenges, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 2014, pp. 167ss. 
88Korea-Beef, Appellate Body Report, para. 162 and 163. 
89A. DESMEDT, Proportionality in WTO law, op. cit., pp. 468ss. 
90M. HILF, Power, rules and principles-which orientation for WTO/GATT Law?, op. cit., pp. 112ss. A. DESMEDT, 
Proportionality in WTO law, op. cit., pp. 442ss. M. ANDENAS, S. ZLEPTNIG, Proportionality: WTO law in comparative 
perspective, op. cit. 
91Korea -Beef, Appellate Body Report, para. 166. 
92Korea -Beef, Appellate Body Report, para. 167. 
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values on which evaluations and choices made by Member States are based93. The 
gradability of the requirement under analysis led to the affirmation of the possibility of a 
diversification of the jurisprudence on the basis of the issue that is highlighted in the 
procedure, thus confirming the opening towards greater activism of the judicial bodies94. 
The relevance of the balance, as an aspect of the requirement of the necessity indicated in 
article XX, confirmed in subsequent rulings95, leads the Appellate Body to specifically 
identify the factors that are relevant in determining the reasonable availability of an 
alternative measure. In particular, in the ruling of the EC-Asbestos case, the need to assess 
the existence of an alternative measure that allows the achievement of the same goal and that 
is "less restrictive on trade than a prohibition" is specified96. 
The determination of the need for a measure for the purpose of applying the exceptions of 
article XX GATT97,  in the light of the norm itself and of the jurisprudence cited, therefore 
entails a balance of different factors, whose traceability to the structure of the proportional 
analysis appears undeniable. 
The interpretation elaborated with reference to the requirement of necessity acquires 
particular importance as it allows to exclude protectionist measures, which go beyond the 
scope of the forecast under analysis. 
 
9.The "related to" measures 
 
The other term used by the article mentioned in the formulation of allowed exceptions is 
"related to". The textual difference led the dispute resolution bodies to believe that there was 
a different degree of connection required between the measure and the policy pursued by the 
State98. As underlined by the Appellate Body in the ruling of the Korea-Beef case, the 
expression used is qualified as "more flexible textually than the" necessity "requirement"99. 
The question that emerges, therefore, concerns the possibility of detecting elements of the 
proportional analysis in the concrete application of the exceptions qualified with the term 
"related to". 
In the search for the meaning attributed to the expression in question, two pronouncements 
of the Appellate Body are highlighted. In the US-Gasoline case, criticizing the reasoning 
followed by the Panel for the lack of clarity, the Appellate Body considers the application of 
article XX let. g) wrong, since the basic rule for the interpretation of the treaties, expressed 
in article 31 VCLT100 has been neglected. Specifically, underlining the need to interpret the 
forecast in analysis included in the context of the Agreement, the AB affirms that the latter 
cannot be given an expansive reading such as to undermine the purpose and object of article 
III.4. GATT. The meaning to be attributed to the exception, continues the deciding body, 
must be sought on the basis of the specific case, investigating the factual and legal context 
relating to the specific dispute without neglecting the words used by individual states to 
                                                 
93According to M. ANDENAS, S. ZLEPTNIG, Proportionality: WTO law in comparative perspective, op. cit., pp. 441ss. 
94A. DESMEDT, Proportionality in WTO law, op. cit., pp. 465ss. 
95F. BAETENS, J. CAIARDO, Frontiers of international economic law: Legal tools to confront interdisciplinary challenges, 
op. cit. 
96EC-Asbestos, Appellate Body Report, para. 172. 
97F. BAETENS, J. CAIARDO, Frontiers of international economic law: Legal tools to confront interdisciplinary challenges, 
op. cit. 
98US-Gasoline, Appellate Body Report, p. 18. 
99Korea-Beef, Appellate Body Report, para. 161. 
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express their intentions101. On the basis of the expression "related to", in the opinion of the 
AB, the correlation exists not only if the measure is primarily aimed at achieving the aim, 
but, in particular, a substantial relationship is configurable, such that the former cannot be 
considered incidentally or inadvertently directed to the second. 
The second relevant ruling for the purposes of this analysis is that relating to the US-Shrimp 
case, where the Appellate Body, in taking up and confirming what was expressed in the 
decision cited above, believes that the forecast requires the existence of a close and authentic 
relationship between the means used and the purpose102. Specifically, the AB considers the 
requirement prescribed by the standard integrated as the measure subject to the procedure "is 
not disproportionately wide in its scope and reach in relation to the policy objective (...)"103. 
In particular, based on the interpretation given in this decision, the forecast in analysis 
requires the existence of a relationship between the means used and the aim pursued which 
is identified in the reasonable correlation, ascertained by analyzing the structure of the 
measure in question. 
If from the reading of the previous pronunciation the applicability of the proportional 
analysis to the assessment of the requirement prescribed by article XX lett. c), e) and g)104, 
the last mentioned decision seems to remove any uncertainty in this regard. Although in the 
light of the norm and of the jurisprudence cited, the requirement in question requires a less 
rigorous approach than the necessity previously analyzed, the opinion according to which 
the expression "related to" configures a more deferential standard is acceptable, which, 
however, includes elements of the proportional method105. Consequently, by comparing the 
two terms used and the concrete application of the exceptions, it seems possible to configure 
a diversity in the relevance of the values to whose protection each individual forecast listed 
in the standard is directed: The environment seems more easily protected than public 
health106. 
The uncontested reference to the existence of a substantial relationship between the means 
used and the purpose to which they are directed, qualified as reasonable, appears to be 
attributable to the element of the principle of proportionality identified in the suitability of 
the measure. Furthermore, the expressed reference made by the Appellate Body to the not 
disproportionate amplitude of the measure subject to the procedure with respect to the aim 
pursued seems to remove any doubt. 
                                                 
101US-Gasoline, Appellate Body Report, par. 18, 19. 
102United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (US-Shrimp), WT/DS58/AB/R, Report of the 
Appellate Body, 12 October 1998, para. 136. D. KÖNIG, The enforcement of the international law of the sea by coastal and 
port States, in Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, 62, 2002, pp. 12ss. In this case, the United 
States had banned the import of shrimps and products derived from countries whose vessels were dedicated to fishing for 
such species using techniques that do not comply with US standards in force for the conservation of sea turtles. While 
admitting the possibility of invoking the art. XX of the GATT to justify unilateral measures implementing an internal 
environmental policy, the Appellate Body considered that in this case the conditions set forth in the chapeau of art. XX and 
thus rejected the US appeal (WTO, WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 October 1998, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products, AB-1998-4, Report of the Appellate Body, in International Legal Materials, 38 (1), 1999, pp. 121ss). 
C.C. JOYNER, Z. TYLER, Marine conservation versus international free trade: Reconciling dolphins with tuna and sea 
turtles with shrimp, in Ocean Development & International Law, 31, 2000, pp. 142ss. G. MOON, GATT article XX and 
human rights. What do we know from the first twenty years?, in Melbourne Journal of International Law, 165, 2015, pp. 
449ss. N. MOSUNOVA, Are non trade values adequately protected under GATT art. XX?, op. cit., pp. 104ss. 
103C.C. JOYNER, Z. TYLER, Marine conservation versus international free trade: Reconciling dolphins with tuna and sea 
turtles with shrimp, op. cit. 
104F. BAETENS, J. CAIARDO, Frontiers of international economic law: Legal tools to confront interdisciplinary 
challenges, op. cit. 
105M. ANDENAS, S. ZLEPTNIG, Proportionality: WTO law in comparative perspective, op. cit., pp. 413ss. 
106A. DESMEDT, Proportionality in WTO law, op. cit., pp. 472ss. 
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A different view, on the contrary, believes that the lack of the requirement that the state 
should choose the least trade restrictive measure could lead to the conclusion that there is no 
question of balancing between state policy and the restriction on trade. However, this 
opinion cannot lead to the conclusion that there is no configurability of a proportional 
approach to the question. The need for a balance appears configurable, although the terms of 
the comparison are different from the ones mentioned above: It is not so much the restriction 
on trade caused by the measure, i.e. the effect produced, but the means used, the measure 
itself, and the purpose to which they are directed. Since it is not the terms that characterize 
the proportional analysis, but rather the method it expresses, it does not seem possible, for 
this reason, to exclude its configurability in the forecast examined. 
However, since the lower rigidity required in ascertaining the correlation requirement is also 
undeniable, there are no elements to be able to affirm the stringent application of all the 
elements of the proportional method, but only the reference to some of them, specifically the 
suitability of the measure and the assumption of its legitimacy. 
 
10.The introductory hat of article XX GATT 
 
Once the justification of the measure has been ascertained in the light of one of the 
exceptions listed in letters a-j, the second phase involves verifying its compliance with the 
introductory cap of article XX, i.e. the measure adopted must not be applied in such a way 
as to constitute by means of arbitrary or unjustified discrimination or a disguised restriction 
on international trade. The purpose of this provision, as defined in the ruling of the AB in the 
US-Gasoline case, to prevent the abuse of the listed exceptions, is not intended to question 
the measure as such, but rather the way in which it is applied107. In the interpretation of the 
Appellate Body, the need that the exceptions "must be applied reasonably", appears to have 
as a corollary the greater weight of the burden of proving that the measure does not 
constitute an abuse with respect to the proof of its compliance with one of the paragraphs 
listed in the forecast. 
The conclusion relating to the function of the forecast under analysis is also confirmed in the 
pronouncement of the US -Shrimp case, where it is further specified that the introductory hat 
includes the recognition by the Member States of the need to maintain a balance between the 
right of a State of invoke one of the exceptions listed in article XX, on the one hand, and the 
substantive rights of the other States enshrined in GATT, on the other hand. The rationale 
and justification of the measure on the basis of the introductory hat of the mentioned 
forecast cannot be constituted by its political objective108. In the opinion of the Appellate 
Body, the beginning of the rule contains the recognition by states of the need to maintain a 
balance between the right of the State to invoke one of the listed exceptions and the duty of 
the same to respect the rights arising from the treated by other Member States109. 
With this last ruling, it is highlighted how the careful balance of different factors constitutes 
the mechanism that allows to avoid abuse in the use of exceptions. Each of the latter is 
limited and conditioned by the substantial obligations contained in the other provisions of 
the Agreement. 
The abusive exercise of the rights contained in the Treaty constitutes a violation not only of 
the rights of the other members, but also of the obligations placed on the author State, by 
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virtue of the qualification of the provision under analysis, carried out by AB, as an 
expression of the principle of good faith of which the doctrine of abuse of law constitutes an 
application110. Therefore, the use of forecasting in analysis involves the search for a balance 
between the rights of the States Parties to the WTO: Respectively that of invoking the 
exception and the substantive ones provided for by the other rules. This line of equilibrium 
is not immutable, but varies with the variation of the measure in question and with the 
diversity of facts relating to the specific case. 
Specifically, the provision prohibits the application of national measures with reference to 
three standards, if they constitute arbitrary or unjustified discrimination between states in 
which the same conditions apply or a disguised restriction on trade. According to a thesis, 
the last cited pronunciation shows that the interpretation and application of these three 
requirements is influenced and governed by the global restrictive approach focused on 
balancing the interests of the party invoking the exception and the other members, in the to 
have confirmation of their rights deriving from the Treaty111.  The judgments cited, in this 
opinion, constitute the manifestation of the AB's preference for a procedure that involves 
balancing interests. 
In order for one of the exceptions listed in article XX112, to be invoked, therefore, the State is 
required to apply the measure in a reasonable manner, taking into account not only its own 
rights, but in particular those of other states. It is this balancing operation that ultimately 
determines arbitrary or unjustified discrimination or constitutes a disguised restriction on 
trade113. 
Nevertheless, given the initial distinction relating to the stages of ascertaining the 
conformity of the measure with article XX, a clarification is appropriate. The object of the 
first phase is the verification of the justifiability of the measure on the basis of one of the 
exceptions listed, in light of the specific connection required between the same and the 
purpose it is intended to achieve, therefore involving a balance of different factors. 
Otherwise, the balancing operation envisaged in the second phase sees the interest of states 
in the liberalization of trade on one hand and, on the other, that of one or more members in 
the protection of national values. 
However, the traceability of the balance, required on the basis of the interpretation given to 
the forecast under analysis, to the principle of proportionality is not uniformly shared. A first 
thesis argues that the purpose of the incipit of the article under analysis is limited and the 
reference to the balance of interests is misleading114. By criticizing the Appellate Body's 
approach, the introduction of a balance would lead to the possibility of considering a 
measure that was legitimately applied on the basis of one of the exceptions listed in article 
XX as illegal, since it is overwhelmed by more important related interests of international 
trade. It would have been preferable that the AB had been content with the consideration of 
the limitation and conditionality of the exceptions: Limited because they are applicable only 
in defined circumstances and conditioned as acceptable in the light of the incipit only if they 
do not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustified discrimination or a disguised restriction 
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on trade. This thesis, however, does not deny the interpretation given to the beginning of 
article XX by applying a balance by the AB, although this approach is criticized as it is 
considered unsupported by the structure of the forecast itself115. 
The reference made by AB to the abuse of the right does not require a balance where the 
conflicting interests are weighed against each other to establish a hierarchy, but a mere 
comparison between the individual rights in question in order to find an acceptable balance 
between the two parts116.  However, this consideration seems to only formally exclude the 
applicability of the principle in question, since the analysis that is developed appears to 
follow some of the elements of proportionality. Secondly, this thesis would seem to ascribe 
to the proportionality principle a function that does not belong to it, namely that of allowing 
the development of hierarchies of values. On the contrary, through the use of this principle, 
the body invested with the question has at its disposal a tool aimed at identifying balances 
between the different interests and values not in an abstract way, but in light of the 
specificities of the concrete case, as underlined by the same pronunciations mentioned. In 
addition, the applicability of this principle does not automatically determine the indication of 
the terms that make up the subject of the analysis, the latter, rather, are identified from time 
to time by the judge in the light of the rules governing the case. 
On the contrary, the need for balancing, as developed by the jurisprudence from AB, 
determines the traceability of the operation to the principle of proportionality, a fortiori if we 
consider its historical and conceptual essence as a principle aimed at balancing public 
policies and interests or individual rights117. Such an approach does not call into question the 
general policy pursued by the State as such, but is aimed at ascertaining whether the measure 
adopted for its implementation is disproportionate or unreasonable. This conclusion appears 
not only acceptable, but also in accordance with the structure of the WTO, as it allows for 
the maintenance of the separation of the national and internal plan from the supranational 
one, limiting the discretion of the deciding body in evaluating the measure subject to the 
procedure, with the consequence to avoid an excessively intrusive investigation into the 
internal policy choices of the State involved. 
In conclusion, in the context of article XX, proportionality can be conceived in its generic 
function, as a flexible principle and tool that guides the legal investigation into the legality 
of the national measure. 
 
11.The SPS and TBT agreements 
 
The SPS Agreement and the one that governs the TBT are highlighted in the consideration 
and application of the principle of proportionality within the WTO dispute resolution system 
since, in establishing detailed positive obligations for national regulations, they are intended 
to mitigate the restrictive effect of trade generated by the latter, leaving a margin of 
discretion to states to pursue their internal policies. This function is carried out through the 
use of standards which, although not explicitly provided for in the agreements, are 
applicable as requirements of national legislation. 
 
12.The SPS Agreement 
                                                 
115F. BAETENS, J. CAIARDO, Frontiers of international economic law: Legal tools to confront interdisciplinary 
challenges, op. cit. 
116A. DESMEDT, Proportionality in WTO law, op. cit., pp. 474, 476. 
117M. ANDENAS, S. ZLEPTNIG, Proportionality: WTO law in comparative perspective, op. cit., pp. 415ss. 
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The SPS Agreement, which aims to avoid unnecessary or concealed restrictions on trade, in 
article 2.2 prescribes the duty of states to ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure, 
with a scientific basis, is applied "only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health". In addition, article 5.6 provides that the same measures cannot be more 
restrictive of trade than required to achieve an appropriate level of sanitary and 
phytosanitary protection. This latter provision is explained by the note attached to it, 
according to which a measure "is not more trade-restrictive than required unless there is 
another measure, reasonably available (...) that achieves the appropriate level of sanitary or 
phytosanitary protection and is significantly less restrictive to trade". Despite their close 
relationship, a violation of the second article cited does not necessarily presuppose a 
discrepancy from article 2.2. 
A measure is qualified as necessary for the protection of health and life if it meets two 
requirements: It must be suitable and required118. While the indispensability of the measure 
for health protection implies the presumption of its necessity, if the same is limited only to 
contributing to the purpose for which it is directed, other factors emerge for the purpose of 
ascertaining its compliance with the prescribed requirements, such as the relevance of the 
objective, the actual contribution made and the negative effects on trade. It follows that the 
greater the relevance of the objective and the contribution to the protection of interest, the 
more easily the measure will be deemed necessary, with less importance of the implications 
on trade. 
The expression used by the standard, requesting that the measure adopted be applied "to the 
extent necessary", incorporates the principle of proportionality in particular with reference to 
the element of suitability119. First of all, it emerges implicitly from the norm, the need that 
the measure is suitable for the protection of life or human, animal or vegetable health120. The 
undeniable existence of a relationship between the measure itself and the purpose it is aimed 
at, finds its expression not only in the request for sufficient scientific evidence, but in 
particular in the need for it to be based on a risk assessment . 
The requirement enshrined in article 2.2, requiring that the measure adopted finds its 
foundation on scientific principles and is not maintained in the absence of scientific 
evidence, reflects the general intent of the SPS Agreement to achieve a balance between the 
promotion of international trade and protection of life and health. The sufficiency of the 
tests, specifically, is directly connected to the necessity of the measure, requiring with the 
latter the configuration of a rational and objective relationship121. It follows that, if on the 
one hand the existence of tests contributes to the positive assessment of the need for the on 
the other hand, the sufficiency of the former depends on the nature and implications of the 
latter. Given the premise, a further element that must therefore be taken into consideration is 
the effects that the measure in question has on trade: the greater the obstacle it generates, the 
more rigorous the scientific justification of the same must be, determined on the basis of the 
risk to health or life involved122. 
The interpretation given to the standard, elaborated in the ruling of the AB relating to the 
                                                 
118R. WOLFRUM, P.T. STOLL, A. SEIBERT-FOHR (eds), WTO-Technical barriers and SPS measures, op. cit. 
119A.D. MITCHELL, C. HENCKELS, Variations on a theme: Comparing the concept of necessity in international 
investment law and WTO law, op. cit., pp. 201ss. 
120A. DESMEDT, Proportionality in WTO law, op. cit., pp. 454ss. F. ORTINO, Basic legal instruments for the liberalization 
of trade: A comparative analysis of EC and WTO law, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Portland, 2004, pp. 445ss.   
121Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products (Japan-Agricultural Products II), WT/DS76/AB/R, Report of the 
Appellate Body, 22 February 1999, para. 84, confirmed in the next sentences: Japan-Apples, Appellate Body Report, para. 
162. M. KENDE, The trade policy review mechanism: A critical analysis, op. cit. 
122R. WOLFRUM, P.T. STOLL, A. SEIBERT-FOHR (eds), WTO-Technical barriers and SPS measures, op. cit. 
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Japan-Apples case, leads to affirm the disproportion of the measure if there is no rational 
and objective relationship between it and the scientific evidence to justify it123. The 
following consideration, in the analysis carried out by the Appellate Body, expresses the 
relativity of the approach used by the Panel, the correctness of which pursuant to article 2.2 
depends on the particular circumstances of the specific case. 
Despite this last statement, the requirement enshrined in the standard does not appear to be 
called into question. Therefore, a peculiar formulation of the requirement of suitability 
emerges as an element of the principle of proportionality: Not only, in fact, is the existence 
of a causal link between the measure and the purpose to which its implementation is 
directed, but article 2.2 of the Agreement also prescribes a procedural requirement, relating 
to the consideration of the evidence. The terms of the comparison considered for the purpose 
of determining disproportionality, in the aforementioned pronunciation, are identified, on the 
one hand, in the measure adopted by the State and, on the other, in the risk that the same is 
aimed at facing demonstrated by the scientific evidence provided. Although this 
consideration, formulated by the Panel in the Japan-Apples case and subject to criticism, 
was not censored by the Appellate Body, which on the contrary gave confirmation of it, the 
same was, however, limited with reference to the specificity of the concrete case124. 
It seems possible to identify two different relationships: the first between the measure 
adopted and the aim pursued to protect life and health, properly attributable to the 
proportional analysis, and, the second, between the measure itself and the ascertained risk. It 
is with reference to the latter two terms that a rational connection must exist125; however, the 
same appears necessary for the purpose of determining the suitability of the measure for the 
realization of the purpose to which it is directed. 
Article 5 of the same Agreement constitutes a specific application of the obligation 
contained in article 2.2. The consideration of the principle of proportionality is highlighted 
with reference to the provision of paragraph 6 which prohibits the adoption of more 
restrictive measures of trade than required for the achievement by the State of an appropriate 
level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection. This provision, including the explanatory notes, 
constitutes a specific expression of necessity as an element of the principle of 
proportionality, also called "less-trade restrictive requirement". This requirement has been 
assimilated to that prescribed by the exception of article XX, let. b) GATT, analyzed 
previously, with reference to the necessity test developed by the jurisprudence126. 
Resuming the ruling of the Australia-Salmon case127, in the light of the definition included in 
the note to the aforementioned provision, there is a violation of the SPS Agreement only if 
the applicant demonstrates the presence of alternative measures that meet three 
requirements: The reasonable availability of the same considered technical and economic 
viability, the achievement of a similar level of protection, the significant lower trade 
restriction than the contested measure128. According to the interpretation given by the AB, 
the measure complies with the SPS Agreement if even one of the elements indicated is not 
integrated. 
                                                 
123Japan-Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples (Japan-Apples), WT/DS245/AB/R, Report of the Appellate Body, 
26 November 2003, para. 163. 
124Japan -Apples, Appellate Body report, para. 164. 
125A. DESMEDT, Proportionality in WTO law, op. cit., pp. 455ss. M. ANDENAS, S. ZLEPTNIG, Proportionality: WTO 
law in comparative perspective, op. cit., pp. 418ss. 
126R. WOLFRUM, P.T. STOLL, A. SEIBERT-FOHR (eds), WTO-Technical barriers and SPS measures, op. cit., pp. 456ss. 
127Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon (Australia-Salmon), WT/DS18/AB/R, Report of the Appellate 
Body, 20 October 1998. A.H. QURESHI, Interpreting WTO agreements, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015. 
128Australia-Salmon, Appellate Body report, para. 194.   
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The existence of an alternative measure is not in itself sufficient to believe a violation exists, 
but it is further necessary that it be "reasonably available", considering its technical and 
economic viability. 
The second element highlighted by the Appellate Body requires an analysis of the level of 
protection chosen by the State, to determine the appropriateness of the measure for its 
implementation. This assessment involves a judgment on the effectiveness of both the 
measure subject to the procedure and the alternative one identified, becoming an element 
that makes the task attributed to the body invested with the matter more difficult, since it 
entails the risk of an excessively intrusive analysis on internal policy choices. However, this 
possibility appears to be avoided thanks to the interpretation of the Appellate Body, 
according to which the consideration of this element does not interfere with the choice of the 
level of national sanitary and phytosanitary protection: The definition of the latter constitutes 
a prerogative of the State, not of the Panel nor of the AB129. The appropriate level of 
protection differs from the measure itself, constituting, the first, the objective and, the 
second, the instrument for its realization. 
Specifically, the correlation between the two is identified by referring to article 5.6 of the 
SPS Agreement on the basis of which the determination of the level of protection appears to 
logically precede, in the decision-making process, the choice and maintenance of the 
sanitary or phytosanitary measure, not the other way around. It follows that the 
aforementioned forecast requires investigating the possible existence of alternative measures 
that achieve the appropriate level of protection, as determined by the State, not judging the 
appropriateness of the level that each member wishes to achieve. 
In order for the last element to be integrated, it is necessary that the restriction on trade 
generated by the alternative measure is significantly lower than that caused by the disputed 
measure. The addition of the term "significantly" not only ensures that slightly more 
restrictive trade measures do not exceed the assessment130, but also constitutes the means by 
which the principle of proportionality can be adapted to the specific needs of the forecast 
interpreted. In fact, the combined reading of the two standards mentioned leads to a peculiar 
vision of the principle of proportionality with reference to its elements: The suitability of the 
measure, indeed, also includes procedural aspects, relevant to the assessment of the 
evidence, with the consequence that, in spite of its compliance with the requirement of 
necessity, it could result in the unsuitability for the realization of the purpose to which it is 
directed131. 
A final provision that is highlighted in consideration of the principle of proportionality in the 
SPS Agreement is article 5.4, where states are required to determine the appropriate level of 
sanitary and phytosanitary protection132. The appropriateness requirement, already emerged 
in the consideration of the countermeasures, prescribed by the SCM Agreement, can be 
interpreted as a sort of balancing, requiring the states, specifically, to consider the objective 
of minimizing the negative effects for the trade in the choice of the measure. However, 
unlike the obligation prescribed with reference to countermeasures, the last mentioned rule 
does not provide for an obligation on the states, but, as analyzed by the AB in the EC-
Hormones case, the use of the term "should" attributes to the simply exhortative value 
                                                 
129Australia-Salmon, Appellate Body report, para. 199-200 and 203-204. 
130R. WOLFRUM, P.T. STOLL, A. SEIBERT-FOHR (eds), WTO-Technical barriers and SPS measures, op. cit., pp. 457ss. 
131A.D. MITCHELL, Legal principles in WTO law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008. 
132F. ORTINO, Basic legal instruments for the liberalization of trade: A comparative analysis of EC and WTO law, op. cit., 
pp. 466ss. 
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prediction133. It follows that, the terminology used and the interpretation of the standard lead 
us to believe that a balance with possible negative effects on trade is not required, in 
determining the appropriate level of protection134. 
It seems possible to identify elements of the principle of proportionality that govern the 
determination of the conformity of the different levels of protection chosen individually by 
the states with the SPS Agreement, avoiding to cause discrimination or restrictions on trade 
not in line with the aim that the sanitary and phytosanitary measures allowed are intended to 
protect135. Although the configurability of a requirement of proportionality stricto sensu is to 
be excluded, the assessment of the suitability of the measure to achieve the objective to 
which it is directed, as well as the ascertainment of the absence of alternative measures less 
restrictive of trade, are elements present in the rules dictated by the Agreement examined. 
 
13.The TBT Agreement 
 
The objective of the TBT Agreement is, first of all, to ensure that technical regulations, 
standards and national procedures aimed at ascertaining compliance with internal 
requirements do not produce unnecessary obstacles to international trade136. 
Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement prescribes an obligation for Member States to ensure that 
technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect of 
creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade. To this end, regulations should not be 
more restrictive than trade "than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking account of 
the risks non-fulfilment would create"137. The forecast continues by listing some purposes 
considered legitimate; in addition, unlike the SPS Agreement, elements that are relevant in 
the risk assessment are also indicated. 
In the context of the Agreement in question, both the aims pursued and the level chosen for 
their implementation are considered the prerogative of the states138. In this regard, the non-
exhaustiveness of the list of purposes that are considered legitimate, contained in the 
aforementioned provision has been affirmed139. It follows that, even with reference to the 
technical regulations pursuant to the TBT Agreement, the level of protection chosen by the 
State cannot be investigated. However, the latter's right to determine this level should be 
balanced with the requirement enshrined in the TBT Agreement. In highlighting the freedom 
of states with regard to the determination of objectives and levels of protection, the same 
Panel that pronounced itself in the EC-Sardines case stated that article 2.2 and the preamble 
of the Agreement impose limits on their regulatory autonomy140. 
The verification of the conformity of the internal measure with article 2.2 develops in two 
                                                 
133EC-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (EC-Hormones (US)), WT/DS26/R, Report of the Panel, 18 August 
1997, para. 8.166. 
134M. ANDENAS, S. ZLEPTNIG, Proportionality: WTO law in comparative perspective, op. cit., pp. 417ss. F. ORTINO, 
Basic legal instruments for the liberalization of trade: A comparative analysis of EC and WTO law, op. cit., pp. 467ss. 
135M. ANDENAS, S. ZLEPTNIG, Proportionality: WTO law in comparative perspective, op. cit., pp. 420ss. 
136According to the preamble of TBT see: S. ZLEPTNIG, Non-economic objectives in WTO Law: Justification provisions 
of GATT, GATS, SPS and TBT Agreements, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden-Boston 2010, pp. 104-105. 
137S. ZLEPTNIG, Non-economic objectives in WTO Law: Justification provisions of GATT, GATS, SPS and TBT 
Agreements, op. cit. 
138European Communities-Trade Description of Sardines (EC-Sardines), WT/DS231/R, Report of the Panel, op. cit. 
139US-Measure Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sales of Tuna and Tuna Products (US-Tuna II), WT/DS381/R, 
Report of the Panel, 15 September 2011, para. 7.437; in the same orientation see also the AB in case: US-Tuna II, 
WT/DS381/AB/R, Report of the Appellate Body, 16 May 2012, para. 313. 
140EC-Sardines, Panel Report, para. 7.120. 
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phases141: First, the measure must be directed towards the realization of a legitimate aim, 
with the consequence that both the latter and its object can be submitted to the judgment of 
the WTO bodies, in order to determine their legitimacy. Second, the measure should not be 
more restrictive than trade than necessary. In this regard, the assessment must take into 
account the risk that failure to achieve the objective could create. 
As for the first requirement, the expression used by the Agreement according to which the 
measure must be "necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective", establishes the need for a causal 
link between the same and the objective pursued, attributable to the method described 
proportional analysis142. The purpose, in fact, constitutes the fundamental reference for 
carrying out the second part of the assessment, aimed at determining whether the measure 
subject to the procedure is more restrictive than trade than is necessary for the achievement 
of the objective143. 
In conducting the first phase of the analysis, as confirmed by the AB in the US-Tuna II 
dispute, the Panel is not bound by the characterization of the purpose given by the State 
involved, but underlines how the conduct of this assessment must be conducted 
independently and objective, taking into consideration the text of the regulations, the 
legislative history and other evidence relating to the structure and operating methods of the 
measure144 . 
Although initially the attribution of the power to investigate the legitimacy of the aim 
pursued by the Panels and the AB was not uniformly shared, the jurisprudence developed 
with reference to the standard under analysis recognizes in a somewhat unequivocal way this 
prerogative for the organs of the system of WTO dispute resolution. 
In the last cited ruling, in addition, the Appellate Body in continuing its analysis, sanctions 
the Panel's task of ascertaining to what extent the technical regulation subject to the 
procedure actually contributes to the legitimate aim pursued by the State, thus confirming 
the need for a correlation between the measure itself and the purpose145. 
The second requirement, on the other hand, is similar to that prescribed by the SPS 
Agreement, analyzed previously. States are required not to create barriers to trade which are 
unnecessary or whose application amounts to arbitrary or unjustified discrimination or to a 
disguised restriction on international trade146. The question that emerges in this regard 
consists in the applicability of the necessity test, as developed by the jurisprudence with 
reference to the SPS Agreement, also to the technical regulations pursuant to the TBT 
Agreement147. Therefore, in order to demonstrate the existence of an infringement, it would 
be necessary to prove that an alternative measure is reasonably available, achieves the 
legitimate aim pursued by the State and is significantly less restrictive of trade than that 
chosen. The similar formulation of the respective relevant provisions in each agreement in 
favor of a positive response, with the consequent possibility of affirming the existence of the 
                                                 
141United States-Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes (US-Clove Cigarettes), WT/DS406/R, 
Report of the Panel, 2 September 2011, para. 7.333; US-Tuna II, Panel Report, para. 7.388. 
142In this regard, the Panel pronounced itself in the US-Clove Cigarettes dispute, stating that the identification of the aim 
pursued constitutes the logical starting point of the analysis to be conducted pursuant to Article 2.2. 
143US-Clove Cigarettes, Panel Report, para. 7, 335; US-Tuna II, Panel Report, para is also placed on the same line. 7.436: 
taking up what was also sanctioned by the Appellate Body in the EC-Sardines dispute, the Panel, on the one hand, confirms 
the prerogative of the States in choosing the aims pursued by the measure adopted and, on the other, believes that this phase 
of the analysis the dispute implies conducting an examination with the consequent determination of the legitimacy of the 
purposes of the measure. 
144US-Tuna II, Appellate Body Report, para. 314. 
145US-Tuna II, Appellate Body Report, para. 317. 
146EC-Sardines, Panel Report, para. 7.120. 
147A. DESMEDT, Proportionality in WTO law, op. cit., pp. 459ss. 
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same essence as the standard of necessity148.   
In the US-Clove Cigarettes dispute, in the face of the position of the United States affirming 
the need to interpret article 2.2 in accordance with the corresponding provision of the SPS 
Agreement, the Panel affirmed the absence of rulings by other Panels or by the AB that 
suggest a difference between the provisions of the SPS Agreement and the jurisprudence 
relating to article XX (b) GATT149. Therefore, this jurisprudence would be relevant for the 
interpretation of article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement to ascertain whether the measure at issue 
is more restrictive of trade than necessary150.   
A few days later, the ruling relating to the US-Tuna II case, where the Panel believes that the 
clarification contained in note n. 3 in article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement, with reference to the 
expression "not more trade-restrictive than required", is relevant for the purposes of the 
interpretation of article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, although the latter regulation does not 
contain any requirement relating to the significant greater restriction on trade than necessary, 
with reference to the technical regulation151. The creation of an "unnecessary obstacle to 
trade" within the meaning of the first part of the standard can be ascertained by considering 
alternative measures that achieve the same result with a lower degree of restrictive trade. 
The first instance body, applying the case law developed with reference to article XX GATT, 
believes that the term "necessary" used in article 2.2 essentially means that the restriction on 
trade must be requested ("required") for the achievement of the legitimate objective pursued 
by the State, according to the level of protection chosen by the latter152.   
The Appellate Body to which the same dispute is referred, confirming the interpretation 
given by the Panel, identifies some factors that constitute the basis for determining the 
existence of the requirement of necessity: the restrictiveness of technical regulation to trade, 
the degree of contribution that it brings to the achievement of the legitimate goal and the 
risks that failure to achieve could create153. This interpretation of article 2.2 is confirmed in 
the subsequent ruling relating to the US-COOL dispute154. 
It therefore seems possible to identify the need for proportionality in the relationship 
existing between the factors indicated by the Appellate Body, in particular due to the 
reference to the comparative analysis with reasonably available alternative measures, as a 
tool aimed at ascertaining whether the measure subject to the procedure is more restrictive 
than necessary155. 
As regards the risk, an uncertainty regarding the meaning of the forecast is detectable. First 
of all, the risk that must be taken into consideration concerns the failure to achieve the 
                                                 
148M. ANDENAS, S. ZLEPTNIG, Proportionality: WTO law in comparative perspective, op. cit., pp. 423ss.of the same 
opinion, thus believing to guarantee uniformity in the interpretation, as well as in the light of the deemed compliance 
between the provision of the SPS Agreement, considered inclusive of note no. 3, with that of Article XX GATT is F. 
ORTINO, Basic legal instruments for the liberalization of trade: A comparative analysis of EC and WTO law, op. cit., pp. 
464ss. 
149F. BAETENS, J. CAIARDO, Frontiers of international economic law: Legal tools to confront interdisciplinary 
challenges, op. cit. 
150US-Clove Cigarettes, Panel Report, para. 7.366, 7.368. 
151US-Tuna II, Panel Report, para. 7.464. 
152US-Tuna II, Panel Report, para.7.458-7.463, para. 7.465. 
153US -Tuna II, Appellate Body Report, para. 318, 322. 
154United States-Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements (US-COOL), WT/DS384/AB/R  and 
WT/DS386/AB/R, Report of the Appellate Body, 29 June 2012, para. 468-469.  M. MATSUHITA, T.J. SCHOENBAUM, 
P.C. MAVROIDIS, The World Trade Organization. Law, practice, and policy, op. cit. 
155US-Tuna II, Appellate Body Report, para. 320. 
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legitimate objective pursued, not that determined by the absence of a technical regulation156. 
Secondly, the expression "taking into account" does not establish a strict obligation, but 
leaves a margin of discretion to the judging body in appreciating the indicated risk. 
The expression contained in the standard appears similar to a balancing operation between 
the relevance of the protected value and the degree with which the regulation contributes to 
the achievement of the purpose, with the consequence that ascertaining the risk of failure to 
achieve the objective would be part of analysis related to the requirement of necessity. On 
the other hand, the expression would also justify the application of the proportional analysis 
in its entirety, authorizing the Panel to determine whether the negative effects on trade are 
excessive or disproportionate to the risk of not achieving the objective pursued, with the 
consequence that a measure could be disproportionate even if it constitutes the least 
restrictive of trade157. In any case, regardless of the approach used, the existence of an 
implicit obligation, enshrined in the law, certifying the need for a rational connection 
between the measure and the assessed risk appears shareable158. 
The application of the principle of proportionality with reference to the standard under 
analysis, however, appears to find confirmation in the interpretation developed by the AB 
with reference to the consideration of the risk. The latter, in fact, leads the Appellate Body to 
consider "a further element of weighing and balancing" in the determination of the need for 
the restriction on trade generated by the technical regulation or, alternatively, of the presence 
of a reasonably available measure, less restrictive trade, which makes an equivalent 
contribution to the legitimate purpose159. 
From the analysis of the text of the TBT Agreement and in particular of article 2.2 it seems 
possible to affirm the use of the principle of proportionality. Not only, in fact, is it expressly 
required to ascertain the lack of less restrictive trade measures, attributable to the element of 
the need for proportional analysis, but the forecast also prescribes a balance between the 
obstacles to trade created by the national measure and the risk of not achieving the objective 
pursued, following the balance of interests that characterizes the principle in question. 
The proportionality requirement pursuant to the SPS and TBT Agreements, most recently 
analyzed, differs from the one detectable in article XX GATT only on a procedural level, 
with reference to the distribution of the burden of proof and not as regards the meaning of 
the forecasts160. In fact, in article XX GATT, proportional analysis is applied to a measure 
that violates provisions contained in the Agreement, if it falls under one of the exceptions 
listed in the standard. Otherwise, in the SPS and TBT Agreements the measure that is taken 
into consideration by the rules does not constitute an exception to the general regime, but is 
the direct object of the discipline, therefore, the need for proportionality acquires its own 
                                                 
156See the case: European Community-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products (EC-Asbestos), 
WT/DS135/R, Report of the Panel, 18 September 2000, para. 3.279 and 3.290. See in argument: R. WOLFRUM, P.T. 
STOLL, H. HESTERMEYER, WTO. Trade in goods, ed. Brill, The Hague, 2010, pp. 510ss. 
M. 157M. ANDENAS, S. ZLEPTNIG, Proportionality: WTO law in comparative perspective, op. cit., pp. 423ss. In 
favour of the latter interpretation lays down the history that led to the drafting of the current TBT Agreement: in one of the 
drafts, in fact, a note was added to Article 2.2 where it was specified that the forecast was aimed at ensuring proportionality 
between the regulations and the risk that failure to achieve the legitimate goal would have created. However, according to a 
thesis, the consideration that the aforementioned note has not been reproduced in the definitive version, constitutes proof 
that the analysis required by the forecast is not attributable to full proportionality, in this regard see J. NEUMANN, E. 
TÜRK, Necessity revisited: Proportionality in World Trade Organization law after Korea-Beef, EC-Asbestos and EU-
Sardines, op. cit., pp. 221ss. 
158A. DESMEDT, Proportionality in WTO law, op. cit., pp. 460ss. 
159US-Tuna II, Appellate Body Report, para. 321. 
160US-Clove Cigarettes, Panel Report, para. 7.363. 
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autonomy161. 
 
14.The use of proportionality in the resolution of disputes according to the ICSID 
Convention 
 
One of the characteristics that determined the success of the ICSID Convention is the purely 
formal discipline for the resolution of disputes prescribed by it and the total absence of 
substantial provisions relating to the protection of foreign investments162. This character 
justifies the absence of provisions where it is possible to find express references to the 
principle of proportionality. However, the use of this principle can be found in some 
decisions of the arbitral tribunals established under the Convention. In particular, if there is 
no express reference to the proportional analysis in its complexity, there is a growing trend 
in applying the intrinsic concept to it or some of its constituent elements. 
The areas in which references to this principle are detectable are various, in particular they 
are found in the application of the FET (Fair and Equitable Treatment) clause163,  in the 
assessment of non-discrimination, which is the subject of a specific chapter, in the system 
exceptions to treaties and indirect expropriations. Of these, the last two areas mentioned are 
of particular interest for the purposes of this discussion, since they allow the configuration of 
a parallelism in the application of the principle of proportionality in the context of 
investments with the corresponding sectors related to the relevant multilateral trading 
system, respectively, to general exceptions and technical barriers. Furthermore, a 
comparison can be made with reference to the quantification of damages by arbitration 
courts in the resolution of disputes relating to investments and the assessment aimed at 
authorizing the suspension of concessions in the WTO, where the principle of 
proportionality can act as a guide in the conduct analysis by the bodies involved in the 
respective issues. 
 
15.The quantification of damages 
 
The typical remedy within the dispute resolution system between private investors and host 
states is compensation. Having ascertained the violation committed, the ICSID Court in 
most cases, in correspondence with the request made by the parties, condemns the 
unsuccessful party to the payment of a sum of money. As already clarified, the compensatory 
remedy does not constitute a constraint for the arbitration panel, which could conclude the 
award with a different type of judgment, but depends on the request of the parties, in 
                                                 
161A. DESMEDT, Proportionality in WTO law, op. cit., pp. 461ss. J. NEUMANN, E. TÜRK, Necessity revisited: 
Proportionality in World Trade Organization law after Korea-Beef, EC-Asbestos and EU-Sardines, op. cit., pp. 217ss. 
162S.W. SCHILL, The multilateralization of international investment law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, 
pp. 62ss. 
163For further analysis see: E. TRUJILLO, Balancing sustainability, the right to regulate, and the need for investor 
protection: Lessons from the trade regime, in Boston College Law Review, 59, 2018, pp. 2740ss. T. LIN, Inter mingling 
TRIPS obligations with an FET standard in investor-State arbitration: An emerging challenge for WTO law?, in Journal of 
World Trade, 50 (1), 2016, pp. 74ss. J. MUNRO, T. WOON, A.D. MITCHELL, Importing WTO general exceptions into 
international investment agreements: Proportionality myths and risks, in Yearbook of International Investment Law & 
Policy, 2016-2017. J. KURZ, The WTO and international investment law: Converging systems, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2016. R. ISLAM, The fair and equitable treatment (FET) standard in international investment 
arbitration: Developing countries in context, ed. Springer, Berlin, 2018. N. BUTLER, S. SUBEDI, The future of 
international investment regulation: Towards a world investment organisation?, in Netherlands International Law Review, 
64 (1), 2017, pp. 68ss. 
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accordance with the typical structure of the arbitration164.   
Under general international law, the Commission of offenses entails the arising of the 
violation of the obligation of full reparation against the injured party by the State. This 
reparation, pursuant to the draft State Responsibility Articles, includes the return, 
compensation and satisfaction, alternatively or contextually, depending on the possibility of 
each of them and the ability to individually integrate the fulfilment of the obligation 
sanctioned165. 
In particular, compensation, subject to restitution, consists in the obligation to compensate 
the damage caused to the extent that the same does not obtain reparation through the first 
method. It covers any damage that can be assessed economically, including also the loss of 
profit insofar as it is determined166. This remedy is kept separate from the compensation due 
to an expropriation carried out by the State167. The difference, in particular, is connected to 
the different reference standards for the purpose of calculating the sum due: In the case of 
expropriation in the legitimate exercise of the powers of the State, in fact, the compensation 
standard is objective and impersonal, consisting of the market value the expropriated 
property whose most frequently used calculation method is the DCF (Discounted Cash 
Flow); otherwise, compensation for damage due to violations of international obligations 
consists of full reparation aimed at restoring the situation that would have existed if the 
offense had not been committed, in accordance with the provisions of the aforementioned 
articles on state responsibility168. 
The question relating to redress due to unlawful conduct also arose before the ICSID courts, 
symptomatic of the problem deriving from it appears the ruling of the arbitration panel of 
the LG&E v. Argentina case. In fact, as the most important consequence of the wrongful act 
is unquestionable is the onset of the obligation of the State to repair the damage caused, 
however, "the questions arise as to the applicable standard and measure of compensation and 
the method to quantify it"169. In particular, in the college's opinion, the issue becomes more 
complex when it comes to defining the standard and the extent of compensation applicable 
to violations of treaties other than expropriations, due to the absence of provisions relating to 
it within the relevant Treaty, as well as the scarce jurisprudence on the subject170. The Court 
recognizes, in fact, the need to differentiate compensation as a consequence of a lawful act, 
from damages resulting from the commission of an illegal act, a distinction that has been 
sanctioned in various arbitration decisions. 
In taking up what stated in the UNCITRAL ruling of the S.D. Myers v. Government of 
Canada of 20 July 1999, the college notes in the absence of a provision expressed in the 
                                                 
164C. SCHREUER, Non-pecuniary remedies in ICSID arbitration, in Arbitration International, 20, 2004, pp. 325ss. 
165Project of Articles on the Responsibility of States for International Illicit Acts  ILC, 2001, artt. 34-39. 
166ILC, art. 36. 
167I. MARBOE, Compensation and damages in international law. The limits of fair market value, in Journal of World 
Investment and Trade, 7, 2006, pp. 723, 768ss. This distincction was mentioned by jurisprudence in the case: Caratube 
International Oil Company LLP and Mr. Devincci Salah Hourani v. Republic of Kazakhstan (Caratube v. Kazakhstan), 
ICSID Case n. ARB/13/13, Award, 27 September 2017, para. 1082. K. DIEL-GLIGOR, Towards consistency in 
international investment jurisprudence. A preliminary ryling system for ICSID arbitration, ed. Brill, The Hague, 2017, pp. 
238ss. Y. DERAINS, J. SICARD-MIRABAL, Introduction to investor-State arbitration, Kluwer Law International, The 
Hague, 2018. 
168K. KLEIN, Les articles sur la responsabilité des organisations internationales: quel bilan tirer des travaux de la CDI?, op. 
cit. 
169LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., LG&E International Inc, v. Argentine Republic (LG&E v. Argentina), ICSID 
Case n. ARB/02/1, Award, 25 July 2007, para. 29. I. MARBOE, Damages in investor-State arbitration. Current issues and 
challenges, ed. Brill, The Hague, 2018, pp. 10ss. 
170LG&E v. Argentina, Award, para. 30 and 38. 
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treaty, the indication of the will of the parties "to leave it open to the Tribunals to determine 
a measure of compensation appropriate to the specific circumstances of the case”171, taking 
into account the principles of international law and the provisions of the relevant treaty172. 
The discretionary nature of the power of the Court in determining the compensation measure 
is therefore underlined. 
On the methods applied for the determination of compensation due for violations of 
international obligations, an analysis can be found in the ICSID Court ruling on the CMS v. 
Argentina dispute173. In fact, the methods used by the courts in relation to the circumstances 
are various; however, the concept on which the commercial evaluation of capital is based, as 
the primary element for the compensatory calculation, is constituted by the market value of 
the same. 
On the compensation owed due to legal expropriations, otherwise, the definition of the 
obligation is known by adopting the Hull formula according to which it is required that it be 
"prompt, adequate and effective", thus sanctioning its determination not only in a 
quantitative sense, but also qualitative and timing174. In fact, the compensation must be 
made without any unreasonable delay, equivalent to the market value of the property 
immediately prior to the requisition, as well as performed through the use of a freely 
transferable currency. 
The calculation of the amount due as compensation is made by quantifying the damage 
suffered by the party due to the violation ascertained. The methods used to calculate the 
compensated damage vary from the DCF to more sophisticated and detailed analyzes, 
likewise different approaches are also detectable in the attribution of interest175. 
The principle of proportionality can take on a relevance in the calculation of the damages 
suffered by the investor, in order to quantify the compensation to which the investor is 
entitled, under different profiles detectable in different rulings of the ICSID Courts. 
The application of the principle of proportionality directly in the assessment of the 
compensation calculated by the Court, due by the host State in favour of the injured investor, 
is found in the Lemire v. Ukraine case. The recourse to this principle is made by the ICSID 
Court due to the violation of the FET clause by Ukraine, for the conduct by the same with 
reference to the investment made by Mr. Lemire. After determining the amount of damage 
suffered by the investor by applying the DCF method, the Court considers that it must test 
the result achieved, considering other parameters in order to confirm the reasonableness of 
the calculation made176. The first of the parameters indicated requires a comparison of the 
                                                 
171For further analysis see: Z. DOUGLAS, The international law of investment claims, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2009, pp. 204ss. C. GIORGETTI, The rules, practice and jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012, pp. 466ss. 
172LG&E v. Argentina, Award, para. 40. 
173CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Argentine Republic (CMS v. Argentina), ICSID Case n. ARB/01/8, Award, 12 
May 2005, para. 401-403. D. BENTOLILA, Arbitrators as lawmakers, Kluwer Law international, New York, 2017. D. 
COLLINS, An introduction to international investment law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2016. 
174G.H. HACKWORTH, Digest of international law, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1942, vol. III, 
pp. 658-659. See also: WORLD BANK (ed.), Legal framework for the treatment of foreign investment. Report to the 
development committee and guidelines for the treatment of foreign direct investment, in International Legal Materials, 31, 
1992, pp. 1363, 1982-1383. 
175A brief analysis of the methods used to calculate the compensation due for an expropriation can be found in B. SABAHI, 
N. J. BIRCH, Comparative compensation for expropriation, in S.W. SCHILL (ed.), International investment law and 
comparative public law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, pp. 755ss. 
176Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine (Lemire v. Ucraina), ICSID case n. ARB/06/18, Award, 28 March 2011, para. 298, 
303-306. For further analysis see also: C.L. BEHARRY, Contemporary and emerging issues on the law of damages and 
valuation in international investment arbitration, ed. Brill, The Hague, 2018. J.E. KALICKI, A. JOUBIN-BRET, Reshaping 
the investor-State dispute settlement system. Journeys for the 21st century, Hotei Publishing, The Hague, 2015, pp. 704ss. 
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compensation to be assigned with the amount invested. Secondly, the Court assesses the risk 
assumed, taking into consideration the actual loss suffered by the investor, inquiring about 
the reasonable proportionality of the amount calculated in relation to the investment made. 
With reference to this aspect, the arbitrators believe there is an adequate proportionality 
between the calculated compensation and the investment of Mr. Lemire, not only 
considering the money, but a combination of the latter, the risk assumed, the personal 
commitment and the essential contribution provided by the investor as a pioneer in the 
sector. The principle of proportionality, in this case, is applied in relation to the result of the 
DCF analysis, of the specific circumstances of the case and in order to verify whether there 
is a fair balance between the compensation and the characteristics of the investment. 
The analysis developed in the cited case does not appear to be attributable to the typical 
structure of the principle of proportionality, aimed at assessing the conduct of the State in 
relation to the individual interest of the investor on which it affects177. The latter approach is 
not detectable in the application of the same principle in the determination of the 
compensation quantum. Rather, the principle of proportionality assumes a peculiar 
configuration, aimed at guaranteeing the correctness of the calculated compensation, not so 
much because of a balance between the conflicting interests of the State and the private 
individual respectively, but in order to avoid excesses or defects in the amount of the 
compensation for damage suffered by the investor. Therefore, the connotation in the 
quantitative meaning assumed by the principle of proportionality applied to this phase of the 
procedure appears to emerge and confirm. The proportional analysis in the determination of 
the quantum seems, in fact, aimed at ensuring the restoration and respect of the balance 
determined in the previous stages of the arbitration procedure, in which the referees 
proceeded to ascertain the alleged violation. 
Proportionality in the aforementioned context is used in order to ensure that the determined 
compensation reflects the specific characteristics of the investor, as well as his conduct and 
the investment made. The application of purely mathematical methods for the calculation of 
the sum due by reason of the commission of the offense, indeed, does not appear sufficient 
to guarantee the correct restoration of the ascertained balance. To this end, the need arises to 
resort to supplementary tools and criteria, variously identified by the individual arbitration 
boards involved in concrete issues, in the exercise of their discretionary powers178. 
The same issue is also addressed by the ICSID Court in the CMS v. Argentina dispute, 
where, similarly to the aforementioned ruling, there is a lack of an indication within the 
reference Treaty in relation to the applicable standard to determine the compensation due for 
violations of the same, in the absence of expropriation. The college therefore believes that it 
                                                 
177S. FACCIO, The application of the principle of proportionality to assess compensation: Some reflection arising from the 
case of Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine, in Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals, 13, 2014, pp. 199, 
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178See for example: American Manufacturing & Trading, Inc. v. Republic of Zaire (AMT v. Zaire), ICSID Case n. 
ARB//93/1, Award, 21 February 1997, para. 7.16-7.21; CMS v. Argentina, Award, para. 249, 443-446; ADC Affiliate 
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must identify the suitable standard in relation to the nature of the violation ascertained, by 
exercising its discretion179. However, in the judgment cited above, the Court does not 
consider the possibility of using the principle of proportionality for the assessment of the 
due compensation. 
A second profile in which the use of proportional analysis is detectable concerns the 
consideration of any negligent contribution generated by the negligent behaviour of the 
same investor in the cause or aggravation of the damage. An approach of this type emerges 
in the ICSID Court ruling on the Occidental Petroleum v. Equador180. Although the 
application of the principle of proportionality is carried out with reference to the assessment 
of the compliance of the sanction adopted by the State based on the investor's conduct, it 
appears possible to detect a space for its appeal also for the purpose of quantifying the 
damage181. In determining the amount of the latter, in fact, the arbitration panel recognizes 
the existence of a defined risky behaviour of the investor, who would have violated the 
investment contract stipulated with the host State, as well as the national law of the latter. 
last. This behaviour facilitated the adoption of the state measure, namely the decree of 
"caducidad" relating to the investment contract; therefore, the expectations of generating 
future income for the private investor would need to be adjusted downwards, in order to take 
this risk into account, by means of a proportional reduction of the sum itself due to the 
culpable contribution of the injured party. 
The need to take into consideration the voluntary or negligent conduct of the actor who 
contributed to the damage is confirmed by commentators and jurisprudence, according to 
which this assessment must entail an appropriate reduction of the amount ascertained for this 
purpose182. This requirement is also enshrined in article 39 of the draft article on state 
responsibility183 and, in the dispute in question, the assessment of the contribution to damage 
is interpreted by one of the arbitrators as "fair and reasonable apportionment of 
responsibility"184.   
The need just expressed is also detectable in the ICSID award relating to the MTD v. Chile 
dispute, where the arbitration panel acknowledges that the investor's conduct has increased 
the risk of the transaction, the responsibility of which remains with him185. Consequently, 
the plaintiff must independently sustain part of the damage suffered, the assessment of 
which made by the college, equal to half, is based on factual considerations and in the 
exercise of his discretion186. This ruling makes no reference to the principle being analyzed, 
although it seems possible to believe that the use of the same could have given greater 
consistency and transparency to the assessment carried out. 
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Proportionality is also referred to in the ruling relating to the Caratube v. Kazakhstan dispute 
with reference to the determination of the possibility of obtaining repair for the loss of 
opportunity. Specifically, the plaintiff believes that "reparation for loss of opportunity is to 
be awarded in proportion to the probability of its occurrence", compensations of this type 
have been awarded by the arbitral tribunals in order to achieve a fair and reasonable result, 
which the recourse to mathematical calculations would not have allowed to achieve187. 
However, the ICSID arbitration panel does not use the proportionality principle in this 
context. First of all, he believes that any damage, in order to obtain compensation, must be 
sufficiently certain, including that relating to the loss of opportunity. Secondly, in 
ascertaining the existence of such damages, the Court uses a probability criterion, namely 
"whether their (the claimants) claim is more probable than not, by a preponderance of 
evidence"188, recognizing the existence a margin of discretion in determining the quantum of 
such damages, which however can be exercised only on the assumption of the existence of 
sufficient evidence provided by the injured party, not integrated in the present case189. 
The reference to proportionality in the determination of damages for loss of opportunity is 
also found in a previous ICSID arbitration ruling, relating to the Gemplus v. Mexico dispute. 
In this case, the arbitral tribunal dealing with the matter refers to the UNIDROIT principles 
relating to international commercial contracts, where it is expressly recognized that 
"compensation may be due for loss of chance in proportion to the probability of its 
occurence"190. Also in this case, for the purpose of determining the loss of opportunity, the 
primary reference remains that of probability. The possibility of using the principle of 
proportionality, which would have a merely quantitative value in determining damages, is 
not further analyzed. 
It is in the Teinver v. Argentina dispute that the respondent State notes the existence of a role 
for the principle of proportionality in determining the compensation relating to the damages 
caused, by referring to the draft articles on  state responsibility191. Specifically, the defendant 
believes that "the ILC considered the significance of proportionality of compensation in 
relation to damage caused, which the respondent impacts the principle of full reparation" as 
articulated in the leading Chorzów Factory case192. In particular, as reported in the decision, 
the defendant refers to the Report of the Commission of International Law where he 
questions the opportunity to articulate the principle of proportionality as an aspect of the 
obligation of full reparation, noting that this principle permeates each form in which this last 
one is perfected. However, the possibility of applying the principle of proportionality, as 
recalled by the State, is not considered relevant in the determination of the due 
compensation due to state expropriation behaviour. The ICSID Court, in fact, distinguishes 
                                                 
187Caratube v. Kazakhstan, Award, para. 1143. 
188MTD v. Chile, Award, par. 248. 
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between full reparation for the violation of an international obligation and the State's right to 
expropriate private property which, otherwise, generates a compensation obligation. The 
question raised by the respondent State with reference to the principle of proportionality 
concerns the full reparation, not the compensation and, therefore, is limited to the profiles 
relating to the determination of damages in international law, in reference to which there is 
an agreement of the parties193. In light of this consideration, the conclusion of the arbitration 
panel does not seem to exclude the possibility of resorting to the principle of proportionality 
in the determination of the full reimbursement due by the offender to the private investor, 
excluding the possibility of resorting to it for the purposes of calculation of compensation 
for expropriation measures. Specifically, it is precisely with reference to the damages 
requested by the private investor that the arbitration panel, believes that "if claimants were 
serious that restitution of their corporate rights was their primary claim for damages, then 
they were under an obligation to establish that right in the circumstances of this case and 
demonstrate that such an award was reasonable and proportionate”194.  In this way, the need 
to demonstrate the existence of a proportionality relationship between the damages 
requested, including the return, and the benefit obtained by the defendant, fulfilment not 
carried out by the plaintiff in the present case, appears to be sanctioned by the Court. 
The brief analysis of the pronouncements in which the possibility of applying the principle 
of proportionality was advanced highlights according to pure opinion that it is not possible 
to identify a uniform approach, nor a coherent trend line. Despite this, it seems possible to 
affirm that the consideration of the principle being analyzed by the ICSID Courts is not 
qualitative, but rather quantitative, connected to the determination of the damage and not 
implying, otherwise, an assessment of the seriousness of the offense committed and of the 
rights involved, similarly to what is argued by a thesis in the field of countermeasures in the 
WTO system, analyzed previously. 
In the light of the analysis carried out, it does not seem possible to identify a uniform 
interpretation and application of the principle of proportionality in the phase of determining 
the compensation by reason of the damages caused by the established offense. The lack of 
specific indications within the BITs generates a case study approach by the referees, who in 
order to guarantee the correctness and reasonableness of the decision make use of variable 
criteria, unlike what appears to emerge within the resolution system WTO disputes, where 
the criteria to which the deciding body must appeal are expressly prescribed and identified 
within the DSU. It follows that the principle of proportionality has been variously used by 
the ICSID Arbitration Courts, both with reference to the single aspect of the decision 
relating to the compensation in which it has been used, and considering the ways in which it 
has been applied. If, on the one hand, these different approaches seem to be attributable to 
the aim of ensuring that the compensation determined is not only correct from a substantial 
point of view, but also balanced, on the other hand they necessarily hinder the predictability 
of the decision. 
 
16.The exceptions to the Treaties 
 
The exceptions included in the investment treaties allow the government to adopt actions 
aimed at achieving a specific regulatory objective which, otherwise, would be in contrast 
with the substantial obligations imposed on the State, on the basis of the same Treaty. In 
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fact, the function they perform is similar to that provided for under article XX GATT in the 
multilateral trading system regulated by WTO195. 
Forecasts of this type have become common in more recent treaties, symptomatic, according 
to a thesis, of the fear of states that the investment courts have paid insufficient attention to 
the autonomy of national regulatory power196. In fact, a peculiarity of many investment 
treaties is consisting of the provision of investor rights without fully addressing the 
relationship between the latter and the persistent state regulatory powers197. Indeed, there is 
no doubt that the States, in the adoption of these treaties, do not intend to strictly obstruct 
these powers, but in the light of an interpretation in accordance with article 31 VCLT198, it is 
appropriate to strike a balance between the protection of investments and the state regulatory 
power. The principle of proportionality is therefore a coherent tool for the interpretation and 
application of the substantive provisions contained in the treaties, in order to allow the 
achievement of the necessary balance. 
An example relating to the clauses inserted in the treaties aimed at regulating the 
relationship with state regulatory power is constituted by article XI of the BIT between the 
United States and Argentina199. The provision mentioned expressly establishes that the 
Treaty does not preclude the application of measures, by each party, necessary for the 
maintenance of public order, the fulfilment of obligations relating to the maintenance or 
restoration of international peace and security or the protection200 of their fundamental 
security interests201. 
Although the aforementioned provision is not expressly formulated as an exception, it 
responds to the illustrated need to ensure the exercise of state regulatory power, regardless of 
the application of the Treaty itself, with reference to the achievement of specific purposes 
indicated in the standard. The assimilability of the provision to the general exceptions of 
article XX GATT emerges both with reference to the structure of the standard in its literal 
formulation, and as regards the objective it is intended to safeguard. 
The aforementioned rule has been the subject of interpretation in some of the numerous 
disputes that have arisen in connection with the adoption of emergency measures by 
Argentina, aimed at addressing the economic crisis of the years 2001-2002. In the 
Continental Casualty v. Argentina dispute202, the ICSID Court dealing with the issue resorted 
to a form of proportional analysis in the interpretation of article XI of the BIT US-Argentina, 
distancing itself from the highly criticized position taken by the previous courts and subject 
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to annulment by the ad hoc committees203. The subject of the dispute is the alleged violation 
of the BIT by Argentina by adopting the measures called "corralito", restrictions on 
withdrawals and transfers from bank current accounts, and "weighing" of the dollar and 
public debt204. 
Argentina develops two general defenses: The first based on article XI of the BIT, the 
second based on the doctrine of the state of necessity according to customary international 
law, codified in article 25 of the Project of articles on  state responsibility of the ILC 
states205. 
In the aforementioned rulings, the ICSID Courts, all chaired by Prof. Francisco Orrego 
Vicuña, had not recognized any autonomy in article XI, but the interpretation of the latter 
rule was incorporated into the defense of necessity according to customary international law. 
This approach was strongly criticized, in particular, by the ad hoc Committee appointed in 
the CMS v. Argentina dispute, who among the manifest errors of interpretation committed 
by the arbitration panel, qualified that of merging article XI of the BIT and article 25 of the 
ILC article Project206. Otherwise, the Court of the case under examination, in the analysis of 
the first defense, interpreting the provision of the Bilateral Treaty in the light of article 31 
VCLT207, considers that the conduct of the parties does not violate their respective 
obligations if the measure has been correctly adopted, as necessary for the maintenance of 
public order or for the protection of fundamental interests related to security208. It follows 
that, pursuant to article XI, measures of this type would not fall within the scope of the 
Treaty; therefore, the party that adopted them did not commit a violation of the relevant BIT 
provision. According to the Court, the aforementioned article restricts or derogates the 
substantial obligations assumed by the parties to the Treaty insofar as the conditions for its 
application are respected: If article XI is applicable, being the necessary measure in order to 
safeguard security interests essential, then the treaty is inapplicable to it; otherwise, if a State 
is forced to resort to a measure in violation of its international obligations, but in accordance 
with article 25 of the ILC Project, it will be exempt from the liability that otherwise would 
result from it209. 
The arbitration panel, therefore, differentiates this defense from that relating to the state of 
necessity, admissible only in exceptional cases, considering that recourse to article XI is not 
necessarily subject to the same condition, but constitutes lex specialis, distinct from 
customary law210. The elaborated consideration confirms the similarity stated above between 
the standard contained in the BIT and the general exceptions governed by the GATT. In fact, 
                                                 
203The reference is to disputes: CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentine (CMS v. Argentina), ICSID 
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both the defense of necessity and the one last analyzed are aimed at allowing some 
flexibility in the concrete application of international obligations, in order to protect national 
interests of primary importance and, secondly, the practical result to which they lead is the 
itself, i.e. to justify conduct that would otherwise be illegal and, consequently, to eliminate 
state responsibility. The correspondence between the provision contained in the BIT and 
article XX GATT is expressly referred to also by the Arbitral Tribunal, which notes the 
existence of a historical model common to the two forecasts211. 
As regards specifically the interpretation of the term "necessity" contained in article XI BIT, 
the aforementioned analogy induces the arbitration panel to resort to the jurisprudence 
elaborated in the WTO dispute resolution system with reference to the application of the 
general exceptions212.  Specifically, the ruling of the AB in the Korea-Beef dispute, as well 
as that of the Panel in the Brazil-Retreated Tires case, summarizing the previous processing, 
is expressly referred to. The Arbitral Tribunal, in fact, affirms that it is well known how the 
term "necessity" refers to a range of different degrees of necessity, included between what is 
indispensable and what contributes to the achievement of a goal. 
Although the analysis of the WTO rule carried out by the ICSID Court is contested during 
the annulment by the investor, the ad hoc Committee rejects the plea invoked as it considers 
that, even if it were admitted that the Court erred in the interpretation of article XI on the 
basis of an incorrect understanding of WTO law. It would possibly be in the presence of an 
error of law, not included among the reasons that legitimize the cancellation pursuant to 
article 52 of the ICSID Convention213. 
It follows that, to ascertain the conformity of the measures with article XI BIT, the Court, 
after verifying that the Argentine crisis falls within the scope of the rule, proceeds to 
investigate whether the measures themselves materially contribute to the achievement of the 
aim to which are directed214. He concludes the examination in a favourable sense, 
considering the latter partly inevitable, partly indispensable and in any case decisive for 
reacting positively to the crisis. 
In the subsequent phase of the analysis, the Court proceeds to consider the adoption of 
reasonably available alternative measures that would have led to an equivalent result, as well 
as the possibility for Argentina to resort to policies that would have avoided or prevented the 
crisis itself, underlining, similarly to what was done by the WTO dispute resolution bodies, 
the non-unionization of the state's economic policy. The analysis carried out, reflecting one 
of the phases of the proportional analysis, leads the Court to conclude that the measures 
were sufficient to face the Argentine crisis and applied "in a reasonable and proportionate 
way", except for the restructuring of some government bonds. Therefore, the conduct of the 
State complies with the conditions required to derogate from its obligations pursuant to 
article XI BIT. 
The analysis carried out by the Court develops in two phases, typical of the application of 
the principle of proportionality: The first aimed at ascertaining the traceability of the 
measure to the provision of article XI, the second attributable to what is also identified with 
the expression "least-restrictive-means test". This approach differs from that used in the 
application of article 25 of the ILC Article Project, where the measure must be the only 
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available means aimed at safeguarding an essential interest of the State215. The distinction 
between article XI BIT and defense based on the state of necessity according to customary 
international law, is confirmed by the ad hoc Committee invested with the request to cancel 
the arbitration award pursuant to article 52 of the ICSID Convention216. 
This ICSID Tribunal ruling demonstrates how some approaches to WTO dispute resolution 
bodies are borrowed in resolving disputes between private investors and states in the ICSID 
system. In particular, the proportional analysis constitutes, for the arbitral tribunal involved 
in the dispute, a tool that allows you to verify whether the host State of the investment has 
made a reasonable balance between the protection of foreign investment and the protection 
of other national interests217. 
In the specific case mentioned, the contamination between the two systems is, in part, 
certainly attributable to one of the elements identified as points of contact between them, 
consisting of the composition of the bodies responsible for resolving disputes. 
The analysis carried out by the ICSID Court in the aforementioned ruling, developed 
according to the two phases examined, was taken up and confirmed by the subsequent 
arbitration panel established according to the ICSID Convention, to which one of the other 
disputes arising from the crisis faced by Argentina was devolved218. 
The decision of the ICSID Court has been criticized with reference to several issues. One of 
the disputes raised specifically concerns the use of WTO law by international investment 
law. According to a thesis, this trespassing would not be justified by the rules that regulate 
the interpretation, codified in the VCLT: The balancing system proper to the international 
trade regime is not a relevant rule that can be used in the interpretation of the BIT pursuant 
to article 31 (3) (c) VCLT, nor a fundamental rule of international law applicable in the case 
of lacunae of the pact law219. In particular, the balancing system drawn from the 
jurisprudence relating to article XX GATT, according to this thesis, does not in no way 
concerns the interests protected by the BIT provision. Despite this criticism, however, 
Alvarez confirms the need to balance the rights of investors and those of the state in the 
interpretation of the BIT, albeit with a more stringent application using the FET clause, i.e. 
ascertaining the violation of substantial rights of fair and equitable treatment of investor 
ownership. 
The criticism that the same wording of the relevant BIT article would totally differentiate 
from the general exceptions of the GATT, also intervenes on the same theme, in particular 
with reference to the absence of a real list of exceptions. In fact, the ICSID Court not only 
misinterpreted the rule in question, but also provided an incorrect reading of its historical 
origins, and failed to consider the structural differences of the two dispute resolution 
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systems220. 
However, these two theses do not appear to be acceptable in the first place, with reference to 
the consideration of the interests involved. In fact, as previously highlighted, the exceptional 
provisions included in both systems are aimed at achieving a similar purpose, determined by 
the need to safeguard the interests of the State higher than those regulated by the respective 
agreements, guaranteeing the possibility of exercising the state regulatory power without 
incurring violations thereof. Nonetheless, the state interests which the rules of an 
exceptional nature are aimed at protecting are often found to coincide in the two systems 
with the consequence that reciprocal influences in the methods of approach to their 
application do not appear to be unjustified. 
A second criticism relates to the distinction made by the Arbitral Tribunal between the 
defense of customary international law based on the need and the provision of article XI 
BIT. The correct application of the rules on the interpretation of the treaties should have led, 
according to this opinion, to consider the clause contained in the BIT compliant and not as a 
derogation from the concept of necessity, but rather aimed at preserving the existing 
customary defenses221. 
Another criticism was also raised directly in relation to the application of the principle of 
proportionality: Despite the reference made, the ICSID Court would not have carried out 
any balancing aimed at explicitly ascertaining whether the effectiveness of the measures 
compensated the impact on investment, nor would it have explicitly considered the 
importance of the objective of the measures themselves222. However, it is the same reading 
of the arbitration award pronounced that denies what is said by this thesis. As for the first 
criticism, it is clear that the arbitration panel proceeded to analyze each alternative measure 
proposed by the applicant investor, in order to carry out the required balance. As regards, 
however, the second, the analysis that the Court must carry out, according to the 
interpretation given to the rule, explicitly excludes the assessment of the importance of the 
objective pursued, what the Court must ascertain is the traceability of the measure to the 
forecast contained in the BIT. 
In the opinion of Mitchell and Henckels, moreover, the assessment of the need for the 
measure should suitably include the assessment of the importance of the purpose to which it 
is directed223. However, this consideration cannot be shared for two reasons: Firstly, the 
assessment of the importance of the objective is previously carried out through the same 
provision contained in the BIT which admits the adoption of measures limited to the 
realization of specifically indicated interests. Therefore, to believe that the Court should 
proceed to ascertain the importance of the purpose, means duplicating an evaluation already 
carried out. Another issue is the level of protection referred to that objective: Once the 
relevance of its protection in a conventional way is admitted, the State remains the choice of 
the latter. Secondly, if the expressed position were accepted, it would end up allowing an 
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excessive intrusion into the sphere of the regulatory autonomy of the State, an expression of 
sovereignty, not only not admissible, but also in contrast with the structure and overall 
functioning of the dispute resolution system in the investment area. It is presumable to 
believe, in fact, that the forecast contained in the article analyzed, as well as those of the 
same kind present in other BITs, is the result of a negotiation between the states, carried out 
with the aim, on the one hand, of preserving and, on the other, to determine and delimit the 
scope of the regulatory autonomy of each, the adoption of which is justified precisely by the 
voluntary assumption of the obligation that derives from it. It therefore appears to exceed the 
analysis of the nature of the necessity of the measure, a new assessment of the importance of 
the purpose, escaping the application of the principle of proportionality as it cannot be traced 
even to the element of suitability or that of legitimacy. 
The last mentioned thesis, however, shares the choice of the arbitral tribunal to consider the 
WTO jurisprudence as a guide in the interpretation and application of the requirement of 
necessity224. 
On the other hand, the opinion of those who not only considers that there is no contradiction 
in the appeal made to the WTO jurisprudence by the ICSID arbitrators, is particularly 
different, but in particular it positively evaluates the proportional approach as it constitutes 
the best available structure with which to deal with the challenges imposed by the ICSID 
and BIT systems225. In fact, in some of the latter there is a clause of necessity, legitimizing 
the adoption by the states of measures which, otherwise, would infringe substantial rights 
attributed by the same treaties; the use of proportionality fits with this structure, allowing the 
referees to objectively address the most controversial issues from a political point of view. 
Clauses of the type found in the BIT between the United States and Argentina are found in 
numerous other investment treaties226. They constitute the only way in which these treaties 
address the relationship between the substantial standards of investor protection and the 
persistence of the State of the power to take actions in the public interest227. Also called 
"Non Precluded Measures Clauses" (NPM clauses)228, they are aimed at preserving the 
regulatory autonomy of the host State of the investment, reversing the general allocation of 
the risk of the state action which therefore passes from the State to the investor. The policy 
areas affected by these provisions may relate to various circumstances, however, they 
generally relate to areas that touch the central core of state governmental functions. The 
same historical origin of the negotiation of so-called clauses NPM within the BIT, in 
particular those stipulated by the United States, is in line with the use of the principle under 
analysis. The latter, in fact, were conceived as intended to achieve the delicate balance 
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between protecting the flexibility of state action, aimed at realizing the public interest, and 
guaranteeing an adequate level of protection for citizens of the same who have invested 
abroad. The correct interpretation of the requirement specifically sanctioned by article XI 
BIT between the United States and Argentina, but also extendable to the standards of other 
BIT having the same nature, in light of its purpose, cannot be traced back to the concept of 
necessity as the only one means available to the State, as required by the use of article 25 of 
the Draft Article relating to state responsibility229. Indeed, the opposite conclusion would 
lead to depriving the BIT forecast of much of its meaning. 
The possibility of considering the meaning to be attributed to the requirement of necessity 
prescribed by article XI BIT in the light of the principle of proportionality, is confirmed also 
considering the listing in the same provision of the public interests that justify the adoption 
of the contested measures, relevant in the analysis to be conducted. The latter, therefore, do 
not constitute a violation of the Treaty if they are adopted for the implementation of the 
former. Proportional analysis is the appropriate tool to conduct the assessment required by 
the application of the rule: It provides transparency, obliging the arbitrators to identify the 
different factors that are relevant for the decision, and allows the illustration of the 
relationship between each of them in based on the specific circumstances of the specific 
case, ensuring that none of the interests involved is sacrificed more than necessary for the 
benefit of others230. 
The clauses of this type contained in the various treaties prescribe the existence of a 
connection between the measure that the State is entitled to adopt and the purpose to which 
it is directed, although the wording of the same differs in the BIT, taking up part of the 
terminology used in article XX GATT. In addition to the requirement of necessity, as 
prescribed in the case examined, it may be required that the measure be, by way of example, 
"related to", "appropriate to", "directed to", or expressly "proportionate to"231. 
The expression used to indicate the link between the measure and the objective to which it is 
directed determines, in addition to the relationship that must exist between them as 
previously analyzed, also the level of incisiveness of the ballot that a judge is required to 
carry out , in order to ascertain the conformity of the measure with the respective BIT 
standard232. Therefore, each of them requires an autonomous interpretation, in the light of 
the rules of international law codified in article 31 VCLT233. 
The use of the principle of proportionality in the context of the exceptions to the treaties 
appears to be a useful tool not only for the correct interpretation of the rule, but also for its 
effective application to the concrete case. In the light of the analysis and the considerations 
developed, it appears consistent with the purpose to which the exceptions are directed as 
well as with the structure of the same, not only the configurability of an analogy between the 
proportional approach used by the ICSID Courts and that developed within the WTO 
jurisprudence in the interpretation of article XX GATT, but also the existence of mutual 
influences and express references of the former to the rulings of the dispute resolution 
bodies of the latter. 
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17.Indirect expropriations 
 
Expropriation means the complete acquisition of private property by the state. In 
international law, this phenomenon constitutes one of the areas in which the tension between 
the protection of investments and conflicting national interests and rights emerges and 
crystallizes234. The expropriation, indeed, recognized as an intrinsic power of the State in 
relation to properties located within its territory, does not constitute as such an offense under 
customary or pact international law, however it saves the presence of additional conditions 
that affect the legitimacy of the act done. 
These acts rarely take place directly, through nationalizations or through the transfer of the 
title from the foreign investor to the State or to a third party, in both cases through the 
physical acquisition of the property. On the other hand, indirect or de facto expropriations 
are decidedly more frequent, involving state measures that do not interfere with the title of 
the property, but which negatively affect the substance of the right or empty the control of 
the owner over it. The latter are not so much characterized by physical acquisition, but rather 
produce the actual loss of management, use or control or a significant decrease in the value 
or assets of a private investor235. 
Many investment treaties do not expressly consider the issue of indirect expropriations or 
provide a definition of them, but contain general clauses that establish the conditions under 
which an expropriation is considered legitimate, considering the same applicable also with 
reference to the former236. 
According to customary international law, expropriations, whether direct or indirect, being 
generalized, are legitimate on the basis of the investment treaties to the extent that they are 
aimed at pursuing a public interest, are implemented in a non-discriminatory way and 
respect the due process guarantees, furthermore, both require compensation237. 
The consideration and discipline of this kind of state measures under the investment treaties 
is the result of a balance between the rights of private investors and the state regulatory 
power. The lack of a generally accepted definition of the concept of indirect expropriation, 
as well as the distinction between the latter and state regulatory measures not subject to the 
obligation of compensation, has led to the development of a wide and different jurisprudence 
on the subject by the courts and international courts that have been dealt with in matters 
pertaining to these phenomena238.  It is precisely with reference to the matter mentioned that 
the principle of proportionality comes into focus, specifically for the purpose of 
distinguishing between legitimate regulations that do not involve the obligation of 
compensation and indirect expropriations which, on the contrary, require it. 
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According to international law, in fact, not every state regulation that negatively interferes 
with property rights can be qualified as expropriation involving the obligation of 
compensation239. The qualification of the measure therefore assumes considerable 
importance since, if its expropriation nature is ascertained, the private investor's right to be 
fully compensated for the loss suffered arises, to protect the investment made; otherwise, 
this right does not exist if the measure falls within the exercise of state regulatory power, not 
subject to the obligation of compensation240. The distinction in question appears rather 
delicate, since, on the one hand, the investigation into the nature of the measure may lead to 
excessive intrusion into the sphere of state sovereignty, as well as the further consequence of 
hindering the exercise of many state functions by putting on the other hand, the regulatory 
power, cannot be excluded a priori that some national regulations may integrate 
expropriations. 
In this regard, certain criteria that allow the qualification of the disputed measure in one or 
the other sense241 can be identified in the vast jurisprudence on the matter. First, the degree 
of interference of the measure with the right of property is considered: In order for it to be 
possible to assert the existence of an expropriation, the disputed measure must deprive the 
investor of the fundamental rights relating to the property or interfere with the investment 
for a considerable period of time. Indeed, mere restrictions on property rights do not 
constitute expropriation. According to this doctrine, called "sole effect", for the purposes of 
classification as indirect expropriation, it notes the consideration of the only effect produced 
by the national measure on the investment, regardless of the aim pursued242. 
The second criterion identified concerns the consideration of the purpose and context of the 
government measure: For the purpose of qualifying the latter as indirect expropriation, its 
traceability to the State's right to promote a recognized social purpose or general well-being 
is assessed. Specifically, the existence of generally recognized considerations relating to 
public health, safety and morality leads to the conclusion of the absence of any requisition. 
The doctrine of "police power", in fact, recognizes the existence of the power of the State to 
restrict private property rights without compensation for the pursuit of a legitimate goal243. 
The application of this doctrine leads to excluding the existence of an expropriation, and 
consequently also the obligation to compensate, due to the purpose pursued by the national 
measure244. 
Intermediate positions, in the qualification of a measure, consider both the effects produced 
and the objectives pursued. Finally, the interference of the measure with reasonable 
investment expectations is also sometimes considered. In this sense, the investor is asked for 
                                                 
239I. BROWNLIE, Principles of public international law, Oxford University Press, New York, 2008, pp. 531-533. 
240U. KRIEBAUM, Regulatory takings: Balancing the interests of the investor and the State, in The Journal of World  
Investment and Trade, 8, 2007, pp. 717, 720. U. KRIEBAUM, Indirect expropriation: A comparative approach” in A. 
GATTINI, A. TANZI, F. FONTANELLI (eds.), General principles of law and international investment arbitration, ed. Brill, 
Leiden, 2018, pp. 429, 436-437. F. BAETENS, Investment law within international law. Integrationist perspectives, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, pp. 331ss. 
241OECD, Indirect expropriation and the “right to regulate” in international investment law, OECD Working Paper on 
International Investment, 2004/04, OECD Publishing, Paris, p. 10ss. See also: C. TITI, Police powers doctrine and 
international investment law, in A. GATTINI, A. TANZI, F. FONTANELLI (eds.), General principles of law and 
international investment arbitration, ed. Brill, Leiden, 2018, pp. 323, 328ss. 
242R. DOLZER, Indirect expropriation: New developments?, New York University Environmental Law Journal, 11, 2002, 
pp. 64ss. In this sense see also: Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States  (Metalclad v. Mexico), NAFTA, ICSID Case n. 
ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, 30 August 2000. D. COLLINS, An introduction to international investment law, op. cit. 
243B. KINGSBURY, S.W: SCHILL, Public law concepts to balance investors’ right with State regulatory actions in the 
public interest-the concept of proportionality, op. cit., pp. 90-91. 
244The pronunciation of the case is an example of the application of this doctrine Methanex Corp. V. United States of 
America (Methanex v. USA), UNCITRAL, Final Award, 3 August 2005. 
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objective proof that his investment is based on a state of affairs that does not include 
changes in the regulatory regime245. 
The qualification of national measures is explicitly considered in some BIT models, with 
different degrees of detail. There are many models that only contain a reference to the 
concept of indirect expropriation or equivalent measures, sanctioning the prohibition on the 
contracting parties to take measures due to the effect they produce. Examples of this type are 
found in the models of France, Germany and the United Kingdom: The first prohibits 
measures with a direct or indirect dispossession effect of foreign investment; the second and, 
in similar terms, the third refer to measures whose effect is equivalent to expropriation or 
nationalization246. The degree of detail is decidedly greater, otherwise, in the US model. Not 
only that, the latter contains a provision aimed at specifying some of the factors that must be 
taken into consideration in order to determine whether or not a state action constitutes 
indirect expropriation, but expressly excludes from this qualification non-discriminatory 
national regulatory actions, designed and applied in order to protect public welfare 
objectives247. Among the examples of legitimate objectives indicated in the same model are 
public health, safety and the environment248. 
The qualification of a measure as indirect expropriation, if its legitimacy has been 
ascertained, determines the obligation on the State that has adopted the same to compensate 
the private investor for the loss suffered. 
The principle of proportionality is relevant in the conduct of the analysis relating to the 
second criterion mentioned249. This consideration was elaborated by the arbitral tribunals 
starting from the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), according to 
which in order for a requisition to be legitimate, the presence of a reasonable and 
foreseeable legal basis is necessary, moreover, there must be a proportion between the 
measure adopted for the pursuit of a general interest and the violation suffered by the private 
victim of the requisition. However, the identification of the factors that must be specifically 
considered in this balance, according to the ECtHR jurisprudence, vary with reference250 to 
                                                 
245Y.L. FORTIER, S.L. DRYMER, Indirect expropriation in the law of international investment: I know it when I see it, or 
caveat investor, in ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal, 19, 2004, pp. 293ss.   
246French Model BIT 2006, Art. 5(2); German Model BIT 2008, Art. 4(2); UK Model BIT 2008, Art. 5(1) and in the same 
spirit see also: Canada Model BIT 2004, Art. 13(1). For further details and analysis see: C. BROWN, Commentaries on 
selected model investment treaties, op. cit., pp. 337ss. 
247US Model BIT 2012, Annex B, para. 4, lett. a) and b). C. BROWN, Commentaries on selected model investment treaties, 
op. cit. 
248A peculiar formulation is contained in the Italian BIT model where, in prescribing the prohibition of indirect 
expropriations with a formulation similar to that of the French model, it establishes an exception aimed at allowing national 
measures that produce the prohibited effect, but which pursue a purpose advertising or a national interest; therefore, in this 
case national regulations aimed at achieving the objectives mentioned fall under the qualification of indirect expropriations, 
with the obligation, expressly sanctioned, to compensate the private investor; see Italy Model BIT 2003, Art. V (2). 
249He believes that the use of the principle of proportionality is compatible with a mitigation of the doctrine of "police 
power", underlining in particular their non-coincidence C. TITI, Police powers doctrine and international investment law, in 
A. GATTINI, A. TANZI, F. FONTANELLI (eds.), General principles of law and international investment arbitration, op. 
cit., pp. 334ss. 
250With reference to the jurisprudence of the ECHR the principle has been advanced primarily in the pronunciation 
Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden of 23 September 1982, para. 69. In the same spirit the case of James and Others v. The 
United Kingdom of 21 February 1986; Mellacher and others v. Austria of 19 December 1989. For further analysis see also: 
F. SPIELMANN, Following the right margin: The European Court of Human Rights and the national margin of 
appreciation doctrine: Waiver or subsidiarity of european review?, in Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 14, 
2012, pp. 384ss. S. GREER, J. GERRARDS, R. SLOWE, Human rights in the Council of Europe and the European Union: 
Achievements, trends and challenges, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018.  W.A. SCHABAS, The European 
Convention on Human Rights: A commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, pp. 1755ss. 
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the concrete case251. 
The use of the principle of proportionality in the qualification of a measure as indirect 
expropriation by the ICSID arbitration courts is clearly identifiable in the Tecmed v. Mexico 
case, although done through the Additional Facilities Rules252. The college, in detecting the 
lack of both the definition of expropriation within the relevant Agreement, and the 
identification of actions or conduct equivalent to it, taking up what sanctioned by the 
previous Arbitral Tribunal in the Metalclad v. Mexico case, qualifies the former as "a 
forcible taking by the government of tangible or intangible property owned by private 
persons by means of administrative or legislative action to that effect (...)"253. The term is 
also extended to situations defined as de facto expropriations, if such actions or laws transfer 
the assets to third parties or deprive the owners of property rights over the assets themselves, 
without assigning them to third parties or to the government254. In particular, the college 
recognizes that forms of indirect expropriation materialize through actions or conduct that 
do not expressly indicate the objective of depriving anyone of the right or property, but 
which produce this effect. 
In order to establish whether a measure qualifies as indirect expropriation, the Arbitral 
Tribunal considers that it carries out a multi-stage analysis. The first requires determining 
whether the investor, due to the disputed measure, has been radically deprived of the use and 
economic enjoyment of his investment, that is, whether the assets involved have lost their 
value or possible economic use for the owner, as well as the extent of the loss. In addition, 
under customary international law, there is an indirect expropriation if the economic value of 
the use, enjoyment or disposal of the goods or rights affected by the measure is neutralized 
or destroyed255.  The jurisprudence has settled in considering that this requirement is 
integrated if there is a "substantial deprivation" of the value, use or enjoyment of the 
investment, determining for this purpose is the intensity and duration of the economic 
deprivation suffered by the investor256 as a result of the measure257. This first phase therefore 
requires consideration of the effects produced against the investor by the measure adopted 
by the State, regardless of the government's intentions. 
Secondly, the ICSID Court considers to verify whether the measure adopted falls within the 
exercise of sovereign powers by the State, within the framework of the "police power", since 
in this case the cause of damage to those subjected to these powers does not attribute to them 
the right to obtain compensation. Although the ascertainment of the legitimacy of the 
exercise of this power must be determined only in accordance with national law and before 
internal courts, the college recognizes that the function attributed to it involves examining 
the conformity of the measure with the agreement invoked, in light the rules contained 
                                                 
251See the case of Beneficio Cappella v. San Marino, European Court of Human Rights, Application n. 40789/98, Judgment 
of 13 July 2004, para. 33. J. CHRISTOFFERSEN, Fair balance: Proportionality, subsidiarity and primarity in the European 
Convention on Human Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 2009, pp. 44, 127-128. Y. ARAI-TAKAHASHI, 
The margin of appreciation doctrine and the principle of proportionality in the jurisprudence of the ECHR, ed. Intersentia, 
Antwerp, Oxford, New York, 2002, pp. 193-194. A. MOWBRAY, A study of the principle of fair balance in the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, in Human Rights Law Review, 10, 2010, pp. 289, 308ss. 
252Tecnica Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. The United Mexican States (Tecmed v. Messico), ICSID Case n. 
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, 29 May 2003. 
253ICSID, Case n. ARB(AF)/00/2, op. cit. 
254Tecmed v. Messico, Award, para. 113, 114. 
255Tecmed v. Messico, Award, para. 115-116 
256see: CMS v. Argentina, Award, para. 262; El Paso Energy International Company v. The Argentine Republic (El Paso v. 
Argentina), ICSID Case n. ARB/03/15, Award, 31 October 2011. 
257Philip Morris Brand Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay  (Philip 
Morris v. Uruguay), ICSID Case n. ARB/10/7, Award, 8 July 2016, Award, para. 192. 
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therein and international law258. Also in this ruling emerges the will of the Court not to 
interfere excessively intrusively with the exercise of sovereign prerogatives by the State 
party to the dispute, expressly excluding the examination of the reasons that led the latter to 
the adoption of a measure internal in order to determine its legitimacy in the light of national 
law. 
According to the ruling, in order to qualify state conduct as expropriation, the third phase of 
the analysis requires an assessment of the proportionality of the contested measures with the 
public interest presumably protected by them and with the legally guaranteed protection of 
investments, considering that the meaning this impact plays a key role in determining 
proportionality259. Although also in this ruling the autonomy of States in defining issues 
pertaining to public policies or the interests of society, as well as actions aimed at 
implementing them, is emphasized, the Court establishes that this consideration does not 
prevent examination of the same in the Agreement. In particular, the evaluation is aimed at 
determining the reasonableness of the measures in relation to the objective, the deprivation 
of economic rights and the legitimate expectations of those affected by the deprivation itself. 
Specifically, there must be a reasonable proportionality relationship between the weight 
imposed on the foreign investor and the objective to be achieved with the expropriation 
measure. 
In resorting to the principle of proportionality, the ICSID Court makes a balance between the 
public interest of the host State in the interference caused and the effects of the same on the 
investor and the interest of the latter in the protection of the investment260. 
The term "police power" is an expression of the sovereign power to promulgate all the 
necessary and appropriate laws in order to protect security, order, morality, public health and 
justice, the concrete exercise of which allows the expropriation of private property for public 
utility purposes261. 
The reference made by the ICSID Court to the so-called "police power" is aimed at 
recognizing the existence of the power to restrict private property rights, without 
compensation, in order to pursue a legitimate goal. The ascertainment of the traceability of 
the measure to the exercise of this power does not automatically determine the non-
compensability of the expropriation suffered, but rather constitutes the prerequisite for the 
passage to the last phase of the procedure. Specifically, the Court requires that the effects 
produced by the measure adopted are proportionate to the power exercised, with reference to 
the objective that the State intends to pursue. 
The ECtHR uses the principle of proportionality in the analysis of the public interest 
underlying the issue of the rule that affects ownership. In particular, according to the Court, 
each State enjoys a margin of discretion in deciding which measures are in the public 
interest; it follows that the Court itself, in examining the disputed measure, will be required 
to comply with the judgment conducted by the legislator in relation to the identification of 
the public interest, except for the manifest lack of a reasonable foundation262. The 
subsequent application of the proportionality principle, however, entails the possibility of 
denying the legality of the national measure even if the purpose for which it was adopted is 
legitimate. 
The reasoning made by the arbitration panel in the delivery of the Tecmed v. Mexico case, 
                                                 
258Tecmed v. Messico, Award, para. 119-120. 
259Tecmed v. Messico, Award, para. 122. 
260ECtHR, In the case of James and Others v. The United Kingdom, Judgment of 21 February 1986, n. 50, para. 46-47. 
261See the voice: “police power” in B.A. GARNER (ed), The black’s law dictionary, West Group, 2007. 
262ECtHR, In the case of James and Others, para. 46ss. 
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which follows this approach, is analyzed by a thesis according to which the diversity of the 
contexts of reference of the two different judges has completely different consequences. It 
follows that, subjecting the legality of an expropriation act to the requirement of 
proportionality in the context of investments, restricts the regulatory freedom of the host 
State in an excessive way compared to the provisions contained in the BIT263. This same 
thesis believes that the Court, in the case cited, inserts the principle of proportionality in the 
process of identifying an indirect expropriation, producing a result totally opposite to that 
reached by the ECtHR. Specifically, on the basis of the jurisprudence of the Court of 
Strasbourg, even if a substantial deprivation of property is non-discriminatory and 
accompanied by compensation, it can still be illegal if it does not comply with the principle 
of proportionality. Otherwise, a discriminatory and uncompensated deprivation of property 
would not qualify as expropriation on the basis of BIT forecasts provided that the contested 
measure is proportionate to the aim pursued. 
However, this view does not appear to be acceptable, specifically with reference to the 
qualification of the national measure. Indeed, it ends up considering proportionality as the 
exclusive requirement that a national measure is required to respect in order not to be 
considered indirect expropriation. It is the same sentence referred to that denies the 
possibility of reaching such a conclusion by indicating a much more complex procedure, 
where consideration of proportionality constitutes its final stage. 
The principle of proportionality is used by the ECtHR in order to decide the justifiability of 
an expropriation, while the ICSID Court uses it directly to qualify the measure as 
expropriation264. It follows that, if the application of the principle of proportionality leads to 
assert that the state measure does not constitute an indirect expropriation, no compensation 
will be due on the basis of the BIT forecasts; while, the application of the principle of 
proportionality by the Court of Strasbourg affects the determination of the legality of the 
measure, without changing its qualification as expropriation. In particular, in the context of 
the protection of human rights, the principle in question is used to ascertain whether a 
balance between the interest of the State and that of the protection of the individual's 
property has been carried out adequately, without contesting the nature expropriation of the 
measure, but by affecting the compensation. 
The pronunciation cited leads to some considerations. Preliminarily, the possibility is 
admitted that the rights pertaining to private property may be limited as a consequence of the 
exercise of sovereign power by the State, without this possibility being mentioned within the 
relevant BIT265. 
Furthermore, the use of the principle of proportionality leads to affirm the existence of an 
indirect expropriation that can be compensated only if the national measures lead to 
disproportionate restrictions on the right of property. Therefore, completing the above, 
private property yields before the exercise of sovereign power, only if the latter is exercised 
proportionately. The application of the principle of proportionality allows, consequently, to 
draw a boundary line between legitimate national regulatory measures and, therefore, not 
subject to the compensation obligation, on the one hand, and countervailable indirect 
expropriations, on the other. 
What has just been said would also be confirmed in the most recent treaties concluded by 
                                                 
263G. BÜCHELER, Proportionality in investor-State arbitration, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, pp. 146-147. 
264U. KRIEBAUM, Regulatory takings: Balancing the interests of the investor and the State, op. cit., pp. 728ss. 
265B. KINGSBURY, S.W. SCHILL, Public law concepts to balance investors’ right with State regulatory actions in the 
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the United States which admit the possibility for the State to take non-discriminatory actions 
for the protection of legitimate public interest objectives, not constituting the same indirect 
expropriations. According to a thesis, forecasts of this type import the use of proportional 
analysis in the application of the concept of indirect expropriation266. 
The distinction between indirect expropriations and non-countervailable limitations 
sanctioned by the Tecmed Court, is taken from the subsequent ICSID rulings. The arbitration 
panel of the Telenor v. Argentina case recognizes as well established the concept that the 
mere exercise by the government of the regulatory power, which implies impediments to 
trade or implies the payment of taxes or other levies, does not in itself constitute 
expropriation267. Continuing along these lines, the Arbitral Tribunal of the Continental 
Casualty v. Argentina268 qualifies non-countervailable limitations as typical governmental 
property laws, mostly involving unavoidable restrictions imposed in order to secure the 
rights of others or generals; these measures do not require compensation, provided that "they 
do not affect property in an intolerable, discriminatory, or disproportionate manner (...)"269. 
The ICSID arbitration judgment relating to the Tecmed case, with reference to the 
application of the proportional analysis, is also taken up in the Azurix v. Argentina case, 
where express reference is made to the pronunciation of the EctHR referred to by the first 
mentioned ruling270. The need for the existence of a reasonable proportional relationship 
between the means used by the State and the purpose to which they are directed constitutes 
an element that must be ascertained, together with the legitimacy of the objective, in order to 
determine the nature of the disputed measure. This proportionality relationship is lost if the 
investor involved "bears an individual and excessive burden"271. 
With the ruling of the Azurix case, the intention of the ICSID Court to clearly find a balance 
between the host State's right to act in the public interest and the protection of the investor's 
rights clearly emerges. The use of the principle of proportionality constitutes the instrument, 
identified by the judging body, which allows the best way to proceed with this balancing, 
due to its very nature. 
The use of proportional analysis for the purpose of proceeding to the aforementioned 
balancing is explicitly sanctioned in the ruling shortly after, relating to the LG&E v. 
Argentina dispute. In this case, in fact, the ICSID Court is clear in believing that in order to 
determine whether a measure constitutes expropriation within the meaning of the reference 
BIT, it must proceed, on the one hand, to balance the degree of interference of the measure 
                                                 
266B. KINGSBURY, S.W. SCHILL, Public law concepts to balance investors’ right with State regulatory actions in the 
public interest -the concept of proportionality, op. cit., pp. 95ss. S.W. SCHILL, Fair and equitable treatment, the rule of law, 
and comparative public law, in S.W. SCHILL (ed), International investment law and comparative public law, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 2010, pp. 151-159 
267Telenor Mobile Communications S.A. v. The Republic of Hungary (Telenor v. Hungary), ICSID Case n. ARB/04/15, 
Award, 13 September 2006, para. 64; 
268ICSID case n. ARB/03/9. For further details see also: E. BJORGE, The evolutionary interpretation of treaties, op. cit., 
pp. 83ss. M. MISRA, The necessity defence and continental casualty importation of WTO principles at the ICSID, in 
McGill Journal of Dispute Resolution, 2 (1), 2015-2016. A. JOSÉ, Revisiting the necessity defence. Continental casualty v. 
Argentina, in Transnational Dispute Management, 3, 2012. G. VAN HARTEN, Sovereign choices and sovereign 
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CHAISSE, China's international investment strategy: Bilateral, regional and global law and policy, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2019, pp. 89ss. K. DIEL-GLIGOR, Towards consistency in international investment jurisprudence. A 
preliminary ruling system for ICSID arbitration, op. cit., pp. 325ss. M. KINNEAR, G.R. FISCHER, Building international 
investment law: The first 50 years of ICSID, Kluwer Law International, New York, 2015. A. PELLET, The case law of the 
ICJ in investment arbitration, in ICSID Review, 28 (2), 2013, pp. 227ss. 
269Continental Casualty v. Argentina, Award, para. 276. 
270Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic (Azurix v. Argentina), ICSID Case n. ARB/01/12, Award, 14 July 2006. 
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with respect to the law owned and, on the other, the state power to adopt its own policies. 
Recognized that the State has the right to take actions having a social or general well-being 
purpose, only where it is disproportionate to the need faced by the measure cannot be 
accepted without the arising of the compensation obligation272. 
Interesting for the purposes of this analysis is the way in which the question of the 
qualification of a measure as indirect expropriation is addressed in the El Paso v. Argentina 
dispute273. First of all, the Court denies the possibility that a general regulation promulgated 
by the State and interfering with the rights of private investors can never be considered 
expropriating, due the consideration according to which the same should be analyzed as an 
exercise of sovereign power or of the "police power". The arbitration panel, in fact, believes 
that the correct approach is to admit that the general regulations do not amount to indirect 
expropriations, however, due to their content, it is possible to ascertain the existence of 
exceptions that determine the expropriating nature of the national measure274. The State, 
indeed, is free to act in the public interest through the pursuit of objectives that constitute its 
expression, such as, for example, environmental protection, the tax system and, the granting 
of state subsidies. This power would run counter to the obligation to grant compensation to 
any activity that is negatively affected by the legislation itself275. In principle, "general non-
discriminatory regulatory measures, adopted in accordance with the rules of good faith and 
due process, do not entail a duty of compensation"276. However, the ICSID Tribunal 
classifies those unreasonable general regulations as indirect expropriations, i.e. arbitrary, 
discriminatory, disproportionate or otherwise unjust, resulting in a neutralization of the 
foreign investor's property rights. In particular, taking up what stated in previous ICSID 
awards, the college underlines the need for reasonableness and proportionality of the state 
measure interfering with private property. 
The disproportionality of the national measure is an indication of its indirect expropriation 
nature; specifically, the balancing carried out involves, on the one hand, interference with 
the property rights of investors and, on the other, the public interest promoted by general 
regulations, as sanctioned in the Tecmed award. General disproportionate regulations can 
potentially be considered expropriating to the extent that there is sufficient interference with 
the rights of the investor. 
Also in the ICSID Court ruling in the Philip Morris v. Uruguay case, compliance with the 
proportionality requirement is sanctioned as a condition that allows to exclude the 
qualification of state conduct in the exercise of its "police power" as indirect 
expropriation277.  The arbitration panel believes that in the recent trade and investment 
treaties the doctrine according to which the possibility of adopting measures aimed at 
maintaining public order or protecting health or morality, in the exercise of powers is 
confirmed by the state. The doctrine of police power excludes not only the countervailability 
of the damage caused to investors, but also the classification of the measure as 
                                                 
272LG&E Energy Corp, LG&E Capital Corp., LG&E International Inc. v. The Argentine Republic (LG&E v. Argentina), 
ICSID Case n. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, 3 October 2006, para. 195. 
273El Paso Energy International Company v. The Argentine Republic (El Paso v. Argentina), ICSID Case n. ARB/03/15, 
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274El Paso v. Argentina, Award, para. 136. 
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December 2002, para. 103, 105. 
276El Paso v. Argentina, Award, para. 240, 241, 243. 
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expropriation278. 
The ICSID Court, in the last mentioned ruling, ascertains the proportionality requirement 
with reference to the objective that the national measures are aimed at achieving, 
considering the same "not arbitrary or unnecessary but (...) potentially effective means to 
protecting public health (...)"279.   
The analysis clearly shows the possibility of drawing a parallel between the interpretation 
and application of the concept of indirect expropriation in the context of foreign investments 
and the legislation enshrined in the TBT agreement negotiated within the WTO with 
reference to the possibility for States to take measures that constitute technical barriers to 
trade. Not only was the use of proportional analysis carried out by the bodies in both sectors, 
which ruled on the contestation of national measures, but the methods of application of the 
same, as well as the developed stages, appear to be superimposable. 
On closer inspection, in fact, the need underlying the recognition of the possibility of 
adopting national measures that respectively constitute restrictions on trade and interference 
with foreign investments, are similar. In the commercial sector, the ratio underlying the 
technical barriers is precisely that of protecting national public interests of primary 
importance; similar interests also constitute the justification for state measures that interfere 
with the property rights of investors. The legitimate objectives that are listed as an example 
in the TBT Agreement, correspond to those that justify the adoption of state measures that 
cannot be qualified as indirect expropriations, in the presence of the additional requirements 
elaborated on the matter. Public safety, health and morality are found in both systems as 
general interests whose protection legitimizes the adoption of national measures not in line 
with the liberalization of trade and the protection of foreign investments. 
 
18.Concluding remarks 
 
The analysis carried out shows that the proportionality principle constitutes a tool not only 
known in both dispute resolution systems covered by this analysis, but also applied in ways 
that can be assimilated to the whole of corresponding contexts. 
The consideration of the regime of exceptions, the general ones governed by Article XX of 
the GATT and those provided by some BITs within clauses called NPM, demonstrates the 
existence of a parallelism in ascertaining the conformity of the concrete measure by the 
bodies called to judge the matter. The provision of clauses that allow exceptions in the two 
systems, in fact, responds to the same need to ensure a balance between the exercise of state 
regulatory power and the fulfilment of obligations assumed at international level. 
Specifically, the implementation of the former is allowed to the detriment of the latter only 
for the achievement of specific legitimate objectives, indicated directly by the respective 
agreement. The principle of proportionality is part of this assessment to limit the exercise of 
state power to the adoption only of the measures that are proportionate to the objective 
pursued. Furthermore, these objectives coincide for the most part in the two different 
systems. 
The latter aspect is also found in the consideration of the justifications that allow the 
adoption of the measures governed by the TBT Agreement, which can be qualified as 
technical barriers, in parallel with those that lead to the verification of the existence of 
indirect expropriations, according to the dispute resolution system ICSID. The power to 
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adopt state measures that hinder trade or affect the property rights of foreign investors is an 
aspect that has been the subject of express negotiation within the WTO, but also detectable 
in the application of the BIT. The adoption of this discipline is determined by the will of 
states to maintain the power to adopt regulations aimed at protecting interests of nations 
higher than the will to liberalize trade and protect foreign investments. Recourse to the 
principle of proportionality emerges in both systems, with reference to this area, as an 
instrument that allows to distinguish measures that comply with the discipline prescribed by 
the respective agreements, and therefore legitimate and admissible, from those which, on the 
contrary, constitute violations of the obligations international contracts assumed by 
individual states, with the consequent rise of the responsibility of the latter. 
The approach used in the two systems aimed at ascertaining the legitimacy of the disputed 
national measure also has symmetries. As the WTO dispute resolution bodies have limited 
the possibility of investigating the purpose that the measure is aimed at achieving, identified 
by the State, so also in the decisions of the ICSID Courts is the will not to interfere in an 
excessively intrusive way with sovereign prerogatives states, excluding the investigation of 
the reasons that led to the adoption of the national measure. In both systems, however, this 
delimitation does not exempt the deciding body from the prerogative of verifying the 
legitimacy of the national conduct in light of the obligations imposed on the international 
level towards the authoring State of the same. 
This phase of the analysis conducted in both WTO and ICSID disputes, is followed by 
ascertaining the proportionality of the contested measure with the objective pursued and 
with the restrictive effect caused. The factors that are specifically taken into consideration by 
the panels and arbitration courts differ not only from each other, but also because of the 
specificity of the specific case. In fact, in both systems it has been stated that the assessment 
should be conducted on a case-by-case basis. 
The assessment of the existence of less intrusive alternative measures that allow the 
achievement of the objective pursued constitutes the phase of the proportional analysis 
applied in both systems with some clarifications. In the WTO jurisprudence, the assessment 
of the need understood as "least-restrictive means test" is expressly required both with 
reference to the application of the general exceptions and to the SPS and TBT agreements, 
where it is expressly sanctioned in article 2.2. The same phase is also detectable in the 
interpretation conducted by the ICSID courts in the application of the BIT rules which 
provide for exceptions. However, in the analysis carried out by the same courts in the 
context of indirect expropriations, the verification of the existence of alternative, less 
intrusive alternative measures with reference to the property rights of the investor with 
respect to that subject of the procedure, which would also allow the realization of the 
legitimate objective. The assessment of the need for the national measure to achieve the 
legitimate objective pursued, however, appears implicit in the assessment of proportionality 
as formulated in the ICSID rulings. The comparison of the weight imposed on the foreign 
investor with the objective pursued allows, in fact, to exclude the proportionality of the 
national legislation if an alternative measure appears to be configurable whose degree of 
interference with property rights is lower than the one contested. The lack of an explicit 
reference to this element in the ICSID rulings, therefore, is not suitable to exclude its 
assessment in the conduct of the proportional analysis with reference to the specific case. 
The reference to the inevitability of the measure carried out by the ICSID Court in the award 
relating to the Continental Casualty v. Argentina dispute confirms what has just been said280. 
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However, the results to which the assessment leads are necessarily different: If the 
disproportionality of the measure is ascertained, this determines, in the WTO system, the 
pronouncement of the recommendation of reconversion in accordance with international 
obligations; in the ICSID context, otherwise, it entails the qualification of the measure as a 
violation of the BIT or, specifically, as an indirect expropriation with consequent obligation 
for the State of compensation towards the foreign investor affected by the same. 
Nonetheless, in both dispute resolution mechanisms, the use of proportional analysis 
constitutes a suitable tool for carrying out the requested assessment, allowing to stem the 
risk of excessive intrusion by the judging body within areas of national sovereignty. The 
application of the principle allows, therefore, to identify the areas of competence of the 
different systems that are involved: on the one hand, the state system and the exercise of the 
powers attributable to its sovereignty, on the other, the judging bodies to which the function 
is resolved to resolve the disputes that are referred to him, within the limits of the powers 
attributed to them. 
Furthermore, not only does the approach that emerges in the application of the principle by 
the WTO dispute resolution bodies and ICSID courts presents numerous similarities and 
points of contact, but the mechanism used by the former is also explicitly recalled and 
applied by the latter, acknowledging a convergence of systems, although not without 
criticism. 
The use of this principle allows, in fact, to contribute to the consistency in the resolution of 
disputes both within each system and in their overall consideration, favouring solutions that, 
although not coincident, are at least compliant with reference to the consideration of aspects 
significant that emerge in both systems, such as the delimitation of state sovereignty, as well 
as the identification of areas of the same that do not allow intrusion by external bodies. 
The principle of proportionality, whose nature appears to be both substantial and procedural, 
also constitutes a tool that allows the judging body to rationalize the decision-making 
procedure, through the application of the analytical structure in which it is composed. The 
use of this structure also allows to increase the transparency of the decision and to avoid the 
possibility of ideological drifts in the resolution of concrete issues, by the members of the 
respective colleges, within each dispute resolution system. 
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